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Preface 
 
This document is a catalog and readers guide to lessons learned, experience, and technical history 
reports, as well as compilation volumes prepared by United Space Alliance personnel for the 
NASA/Johnson Space Center (JSC) Flight Dynamics Division.
1
   It is intended to make it easier 
for future generations of engineers to locate knowledge capture documentation from the Shuttle 
Program.   
 
The first chapter covers observations on documentation quality and research challenges 
encountered during the Space Shuttle and Orion programs.  The second chapter covers the 
knowledge capture approach used to create many of the reports covered in this document.  These 
chapters are intended to provide future flight programs with insight that could be used to 
formulate knowledge capture and management strategies. 
 
The following chapters contain descriptions of each knowledge capture report.  The majority of 
the reports concern the Space Shuttle.  Three are included that were written in support of the 
Orion Program.  Most of the reports were written from the years 2001 to 2011.  Lessons learned 
reports concern primarily the shuttle Global Positioning System (GPS) upgrade and the 
knowledge capture process.  Experience reports on navigation and rendezvous provide examples 
of how challenges were overcome and how best practices were identified and applied.  Some 
reports are of a more technical history nature covering navigation and rendezvous.  They provide 
an overview of mission activities and the evolution of operations concepts and trajectory design.  
The lessons learned, experience, and history reports would be considered secondary sources by 
historians and archivists. 
 
Compilation volumes preserve key historical documents (memos, presentations, reports) covering 
powered flight guidance, rendezvous, and navigation.  These would be considered primary 
sources by historians and archivists.  Document overviews in each volume provide context for 
understanding the primary source materials. 
 
The reports presented in this document are NASA contractor reports, JSC documents, publically 
available conference papers and journal articles.  NASA contractor reports may be obtained from 
the NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS) on the internet.  JSC documents are available from 
the JSC Scientific Technical and Information Center (STIC, mail code IS23) in Building 45 and 
may be ordered through the technical library at any NASA center.
2
  Conference papers and 
journal articles can be obtained from the sponsoring professional organization (AAS, AIAA, 
IEEE, ION) websites or through libraries at NASA centers and universities.
3
   
                                                 
1
 At the time of publication the Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) Flight Dynamics Division (code 
DM) performed mission planning, trajectory design, some crew training, and real-time mission support for 
the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) Programs.  It also performed mission planning and 
trajectory oversight, as well as real-time mission support, for ISS Visiting Vehicles (Soyuz, Progress, ATV, 
HTV, Dragon, Cygnus, etc.). 
2
 Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2101 NASA Parkway, 
Houston, TX  77058-3696 
3
 AAS – American Astronautical Society, AIAA – American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 
IEEE – Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, ION – Institute of Navigation.   
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Introduction 
The near simultaneous terminations of the Space Shuttle and Constellation Programs presents a 
significant challenge for ensuring the preservation and continuity of NASA’s human space flight 
brain trust.  “How do we preserve and rebuild the brain trust for future flight programs?” is a 
question that many within NASA have been asking.  Future programs will not exactly duplicate 
the technical and flight technique approaches of the Space Shuttle, but much of the knowledge 
and experience of shuttle personnel will be valuable for new programs to reduce technical, cost, 
and schedule risk.   
 
The 2010 report of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) expressed this concern, 
 
“NASA has deep knowledge built over many years on how to put humans into 
space, and this knowledge could be very useful to commercial developers. There 
is excellent work being done across the spectrum of the Shuttle, the ISS, and 
Constellation. It will be a great loss to the Nation and to humankind if this 
knowledge is not captured, managed, and effectively utilized.”1 
 
This is not a new concern.  In the introduction to the 1967 NASA publication Scientific Satellites 
Deputy Associate Administrator (Sciences) John E. Naugle wrote, 
 
“There is grave danger that the line of development of space equipment and 
instrumentation may be lost if care is not given to its preservation. Much 
information is contained in in-house reports, but, as in all active fields, the 
records are scattered, often incomplete, and sometimes silent on important points. 
In time, personnel, too, can be expected to begin to scatter. While it can still be 
recovered, it is important that this information be recorded.  Otherwise, in the 
future much of the usefulness of present-day measurements could be jeopardized. 
As future investigators try to assess past results and to combine them with their 
own, they will need to know accurately how the results were obtained.”2  
 
Effective knowledge capture and management to address corporate knowledge loss concerns is 
beneficial for engineers and managers working on the design, development, test, and engineering 
(DDT&E) phase of a program as well as during the planning and execution of missions.  In 
addition to mitigating the risk of corporate knowledge loss, effective knowledge capture and 
management can also enable engineers and management to identify trends of potentially 
anomalous spacecraft systems performance that could result in the failure to meet mission 
objectives or loss of the vehicle and crew.  Loss of both Challenger and Columbia were due to a 
lack of understanding of hardware performance.  In the case of Challenger it was Solid Rocket 
Booster o-ring performance at cold temperatures, and in the case of Columbia it was External 
Tank foam shedding. 
                                                 
1
 Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Annual Report for 2010, NASA, Washington, DC, January 2011. 
2
 Corliss, William R., Scientific Satellites, NASA-SP-133, NASA, Washington, DC, 1967. 
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Allan J. McDonald, the senior Morton Thiokol representative at the STS-51L Flight Readiness 
Review (FRR) held at the Kennedy Space Center recommend that Challenger not be launched 
due to cold weather.  He later wrote: 
 
“I wasn’t recommending not launching because of what I knew, but because of 
what I didn’t know, and I thought that NASA was in the same position.  It just 
wasn’t worth taking the risk with all these unknowns.”3 
 
Technical discoveries are more likely to be made or recognized by intellectually curious 
personnel that seek understanding of systems performance and theory underlining system and 
software design. These discoveries are typically made when spacecraft systems are operated at 
the extremities of the performance envelop, when understanding of systems performance is 
recognized as being inadequate, or when interactions between hardware and software elements 
of spacecraft systems are not fully understood.  Technical discoveries are learning experiences 
that should be followed by explicit and tacit knowledge capture so that knowledge gained is 
preserved and passed on to current and future personnel.
4
 
 
During the DDT&E phase of a flight program engineers may evaluate legacy flight programs for 
algorithms, hardware designs, integration architectures, and mission design techniques that could 
be re-used to reduce cost, schedule, and system development risk.  Well-written documentation 
from legacy programs enables spacecraft DDT&E personnel to determine if legacy technical 
solutions are applicable to a future flight program.  Furthermore, system design rationale and 
history from legacy programs may enable DDT&E personnel to anticipate technical and 
performance challenges, and write more robust and realistic requirements. 
 
Effective knowledge capture and management during the DDT&E phase can reduce risk and 
increase the likelihood of mission success during the flight phase.   Ensuring safety and mission 
success depends on development, verification, performance analysis, and maintenance of 
hardware and software in on‐board systems, ground systems, and ground facilities. Extensive 
analysis is performed in support of mission design, procedure development, and hardware 
evaluation. These activities require insight into underlying theory, requirements rationale, 
analysis techniques, systems performance and modification history, and software tools over the 
life of a program. The increasing complexity and proliferation of computer networks in on‐board 
and ground systems necessitates insight into software design and operation.
5
 
 
Many engineers working on the operations side of a flight program may not have participated in 
the development and certification of the spacecraft hardware and software they are concerned 
with.  As a result, they may lack insight into systems design rationale.  Some insight may be 
obtained through social networking with more knowledgeable engineers or from preserved 
                                                 
3
 McDonald, Allan J., with James R. Hansen, Truth, Lies, and O-Rings, University Press of Florida, Gainesville, FL, 
2009, page 4. 
4
 Proceedings of the F-8 Digital Fly-By-Wire and Supercritical Wing First Flight’s 20th Anniversary Celebration, 
May 27, 1992, NASA Dryden Flight Research Center, NASA Conference Publication 3256, Volume I, page 16. 
5
 Goodman, John L., Knowledge Capture and Management for Space Flight Systems, NASA Contractor Report 
NASA/CR-2005-213692, NASA Johnson Space Center, October 2005. 
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documentation (if documentation was prepared in the first place).  However, over time 
knowledge loss occurs as key personnel leave flight programs, corporate and government agency 
reorganizations occur, or as documentation is lost or purposely discarded.  The end of flight 
programs and loss of personnel through layoffs can destroy a brain trust that has been maintained 
and nurtured for years or decades. 
 
Aerospace text books and technical papers in the open literature provide limited coverage of 
algorithms, hardware, and mission design techniques as actually applied to launch vehicles and 
spacecraft.  Even if an algorithm or hardware unit has demonstrated excellent performance over 
the life of a flight program, a thorough understanding of it is still required to address 
performance anomalies or apply the algorithm or hardware to new flight programs. 
 
Corporate knowledge loss negatively impacts the ability of engineers to perform accurate 
analyses in a timely manner. Significant amounts of time may be expended in an attempt to 
understand analyses performed and technical decisions made in the past. In some cases, lack of 
insight may force an analysis to be completely redone. Incomplete understanding of system 
requirements rationale, underlying design theory, and systems performance history degrades the 
quality of engineering work. Corporate knowledge loss also makes it difficult for engineers to 
understand, evaluate, modify and reuse software years or decades after it was written and 
certified. The same is true for hardware and ground facilities. The result is increased life cycle 
costs and risk to safety and mission success.  
 
Effective mentoring and access to key historical documentation for second, third, fourth, and 
subsequent generations of engineers is critical in an industry with a turnover rate and little 
margin for error.  Creation and preservation of informative and well-written documentation is a 
necessary for ensuring good contract performance and mission success.
5
 
 
In his memoir Truth, Lies, and O-Rings former Morton Thiokol engineering manager Allan J. 
McDonald identified the primary lesson from the Challenger and Columbia accidents by writing: 
 
“I sincerely hope that we will have learned the powerful lesson that the 
Challenger and Columbia accidents should have taught us all.  That lesson is that 
problems in technically complex systems must be addressed with total honesty by 
highly competent scientists and engineers of high integrity.  There is no place for 
bureaucratic solutions to technical problems, and any attempt to do so should be 
resisted by ethical engineers and scientists.”6 
 
Addressing technical issues in this manner requires curious personnel who rigorously pursue 
better understanding of vehicle systems performance and identification of potential risks.  
Effective knowledge capture and management is necessary to enable and support such 
investigations.    
 
                                                 
6
 McDonald, Allan J., with James R. Hansen, Truth, Lies, and O-Rings, University Press of Florida, Gainesville, FL, 
2009, page 563. 
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Observations on Documentation Quality and Research 
Challenges 
 
This chapter covers experiences and lessons learned from performing technical history 
research and knowledge capture.  A considerable amount of research on Apollo and the 
Space Shuttle was conducted as part of the Orbital Space Plane (OSP) and Orion 
Programs.  These experiences and lessons influenced the knowledge capture approach 
taken by United Space Alliance personnel when writing some of the reports discussed in 
this volume, as well as recommendations for knowledge capture given to the NASA/JSC 
Mission Operations Directorate at the end of the Shuttle Program.
1, 2  
  
                                                 
1
 Goodman, John, “Lessons Learned From Lessons Learned,” presented at the USA Engineering Team 
Lessons Learned Summit With USA Constellation Personnel, San Antonio, TX, July 8, 2008. 
2
 Goodman, John, “Thoughts on Knowledge Capture for Shuttle Retirement and Transition,” presentation 
to the NASA/JSC Flight Design and Dynamics Division (DM) Issues Meeting, January 11, 2010. 
Observations on Documentation Quality and Research Challenges 
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Programmatic Histories Compared to Technical Documentation 
 
Formal space program histories are usually written to address broad programmatic, 
policy, political, diplomatic, economic, cultural, and program management topics.
1
  
Identifying and understanding past program challenges and applying lessons learned at 
the programmatic management and agency policy level is just as important for the 
success of space flight programs as identifying challenges, and applying lessons learned 
and best practices at the technical level.
2, 3
  Other historical works are written for the 
general public (often with a human interest angle) to increase understanding of and 
appreciation for space flight technical and scientific accomplishments.  These works are 
of value to historians, space policy specialists, and members of the general public that are 
space enthusiasts.   
 
Traditional histories may also provide useful background information for engineers and 
managers developing vehicle and supporting systems and operations concepts (crew and 
ground activities including mission planning, hardware and software preparation, 
training, mission execution, and post flight activities).  For example, the decision to adopt 
the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous (LOR) mission profile over other, higher risk profiles for 
Apollo was a key to meeting President Kennedy’s goal of landing a crew on the Moon 
and returning them safely to Earth before 1970.  The NASA History Monograph 
Enchanted Rendezvous describes the advocacy role played by John Houbolt during the 
lunar mission profile debates in 1961 and 1962 that led to the adoption of LOR.  The 
monograph illustrates for future generations of engineers and managers the important role 
of advocacy and associated communication skills in getting a flight program to adopt the 
best and lowest risk technical solution.
4
 
 
While traditional historical works are valuable for understanding the big picture of a 
flight program, they typically contain little technical detail that is useful for identifying 
technical lessons learned, how technical challenges were overcome, or rationale behind 
                                                 
1
 For an overview of the historiography and sub-genres of historical works concerning the U.S. space 
program see Siddiqi, Asif A., “American Space History: Legacies, Questions, and Opportunities for Future 
Research,” chapter 14 in Critical Issues in the History of Space Flight, NASA SP-2006-4702, edited by 
Steven J. Dick and Roger D. Launius, NASA, Washington, DC, 2006.  
2
 An excellent example is the National Polar Environment Satellite System (NPOESS), canceled in 
February of 2010 by the White House.  See Hall, Tim, “NPOESS Lessons Evaluation, Executive 
Summary,” Aerospace Corporation, December 1, 2010.  At the time of publication available at the NOAA 
Office of Systems Development website, http://www.osd.noaa.gov/download/NPOESSAerospaceReport 
.pdf  . 
3
 For examples from a U.S. Air Force space perspective see:  
   Taverney, Thomas D., and James D. Rendleman, “Ten Rules for Common Sense Space Acquisition,” 
High Frontier, Vol. 6, No. 1, November 2009, pages 53-65. 
   Rendleman, James D., and J. Walter Faulconer, “Escaping the Space Acquisition Death Spiral,” Parts 1, 
2, and 3, High Frontier, Vol. 7, No. 4, August 2011.  High Frontier was published by the United States Air 
Force Space Command (http://www.afspc.af.mil/library/highfrontier journalarchive.asp). 
4
 Hansen, James R., Enchanted Rendezvous: John C. Houbolt and the Genesis of the Lunar-Orbit 
Rendezvous Concept, Monograph in Aerospace History, No. 4, NASA, Washington, DC, 1995.  The 
author, Dr. James Hansen, later wrote the authorized biography of Neil Armstrong, First Man. 
Observations on Documentation Quality and Research Challenges 
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vehicle systems requirements, system design, spacecraft and ground facility operation, 
and mission planning.
5
  Furthermore, traditional histories are usually written with 
limitations on content driven by export control regulations, limited manuscript length, 
and limits on cost and schedule to ensure that the publisher makes a profit.
6, 7, 8
 
 
                                                 
5
 The NASA history of the Apollo/Soyuz Test Project (ASTP), published in 1978, was researched and 
written by the authors while embedded with ASTP personnel at the NASA Johnson Space Center.  While 
they had to be selective in terms of level of detail and what to cover, they wrote about topics and 
discussions that might not have been covered in a more traditional history.  For example, details of ASTP 
docking hardware development and Reaction Control System jet plume impingement were of interest to 
later engineers working on the shuttle missions to Mir and ISS.  However, this non-traditional approach to 
writing history along with publication three years after the ASTP mission did not permit the authors to 
place ASTP in the broader historical context of later Cold War events and the eventual break-up of the 
Soviet Union that ended the Cold War.  See Ezell, E. C., and L. N. Ezell, The Partnership, A History of the 
Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, NASA SP-4209, NASA, Washington, DC, 1978. 
6
 An excellent example of a book length technical history is the 681 page tome by Dennis Jenkins on the X-
15 program.   This book contains a significant amount of technical detail, woven into a story along with the 
programmatic and historical aspects of the X-15 that would be useful resource for personnel working on 
future hypersonic flight programs.   It bridges the gap between traditional programmatic histories and 
detailed technical reports.  Unfortunately, books containing this level of detail are not available for the 
Apollo, Space Shuttle, and International Space Station Programs.  See Jenkins, Dennis R., X:15: Extending 
the Frontiers of Flight, NASA SP-2007-562, NASA, Washington, DC, 2007. 
7
 Another excellent example of a book length technical history of a flight program is the three volume work 
by Dr. William Corliss on the Pioneer 6, 7, 8, and 9 interplanetary probes of the 1960s. 
Corliss, W. R., The Interplanetary Pioneers. Volume 1: Summary, NASA-SP-278, NASA, Washington, 
DC, 1972. 
Corliss, W. R., The Interplanetary Pioneers, Volume 2: System Design and Development, NASA-SP-279, 
NASA, Washington, DC, 1972. 
Corliss, W. R., The Interplanetary Pioneers. Volume 3: Operations, NASA-SP-280, NASA, Washington, 
DC, 1972. 
8
 The NASA publication Wings In Orbit is an excellent overview of the accomplishments of the Shuttle 
Program.  However, it is written for members of the general public interested in science and technology at a 
Scientific American reading level, rather than for technical personnel working on future flight programs.  
See Hale, Wayne (executive editor), Wings In Orbit: Scientific and Engineering Legacies of the Space 
Shuttle, NASA/SP-2010-3409, NASA, Washington, DC, 2011. 
Observations on Documentation Quality and Research Challenges 
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Relative Quality of Apollo and Space Shuttle Documentation  
 
The best sources of Apollo and early shuttle information were detailed technical reports 
written by technical personnel at the time of a mission or when an analysis was 
conducted.  The most informative reports were written using the assumption that a future 
reader might not have worked the mission.  Reports written with complete sentences and 
paragraphs were more educational than presentations using bullet points or data and 
cryptic notes in spreadsheets.  Apollo documentation was often better written and more 
informative than shuttle documentation.  Most Apollo documentation consists of informal 
memos and formal reports written in complete sentences and paragraphs, while most 
shuttle documentation consisted of bullet charts and spreadsheets.  Some personnel 
discovered that they acquired a better understanding of what happened during Apollo 
missions than during more recent shuttle missions.
1
  Conference papers written during the 
Apollo Program were also informative.
2
   
 
The Apollo Experience Reports were particularly helpful to Orion personnel researching 
Apollo.
3
  In March of 1969, four months before the Apollo 11 lunar landing, Apollo 
Program management recognized the need to document the technical and management 
knowledge and experience of the Apollo Program.  Direction was given in May of 1969 
(two months before the first lunar landing) for reports to be written about each major 
spacecraft sub-system and major system.
4
  These reports would outline Apollo system 
design concepts and recommend changes for future flight programs.  The reports were to 
detail the underlying philosophical considerations behind systems design (why things 
were they way they were) and failed design approaches.  In addition, the reports also 
covered project management, flight operations, mission planning, and crew training.  An 
Apollo Experience Report Editorial Committee (AEREC) was established in December 
1969.  Due to the comprehensive coverage of the experience reports the Apollo Program 
decided in March of 1970 to cancel post-flight technical conferences similar to those 
conducted during the Mercury and Gemini Programs.
5,6,7
  Eventually about 121 
experience reports were published, with most approved for publication by 1973.
8
  Reports 
                                                 
1
 The NASA Mission Reports series published by Apogee Books was particularly useful for Apollo 
research.  These reports contained, for each mission, numerous and technically detailed press releases, post 
flight reports, and transcripts of the post-flight crew debriefings.   
2
 The MIT Instrumentation Laboratory, later renamed the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, published many 
informative papers during the Apollo Program concerning the primary guidance, navigation, and control 
system on the Command and Lunar Modules. 
3
 Holman, D. N., “The Apollo Experience Reports,” 20th International Technical Communications 
Conference, Houston, TX, May 9-12, 1973, sponsored by the Society for Technical Communication. 
4
 The first half of 1969 was arguably the busiest period in the history of NASA’s human flight program. 
5
 Mercury Project Summary – Including Results Of The Fourth Manned Orbital Flight, May 15-16, 1963, 
NASA SP-45, Washington, D.C., October, 1963. 
6
 Gemini Midprogram Conference Including Experiment Results, NASA SP-121, NASA Manned 
Spacecraft Center, Houston, TX, February 23-25, 1966. 
7
 Gemini Summary Conference, NASA SP-138, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, TX, February 
1-2, 1967. 
8
 At the time of this publication the reports were available through the NASA Technical Reports Server 
website on the internet. 
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similar to The Apollo Experience Reports can enable personnel working in future 
spacecraft development programs to quickly identify challenges faced by previous 
programs, and determine if those challenges and associated technical approaches are 
applicable to a new development effort.  Challenges that were not overcome in a previous 
program may be overcome in a future program due to advances in technology. 
 
There are four reasons why Apollo documentation was of higher quality and more 
available than shuttle documentation.  Many personnel that participated in Apollo 
development in the 1960s remained with the program into the early 1970s and were able 
to contribute to the research and writing of various types of knowledge capture 
documentation, such as The Apollo Experience Reports.  On the other hand many 1970s 
shuttle development personnel left the Shuttle Program in the 1980s and 1990s and were 
not available to contribute to later shuttle knowledge capture efforts.  The second reason 
concerned the much higher flight rate of the Space Shuttle as compared to the Apollo 
lunar missions.  Shuttle personnel (and Mission Control, crew training, and flight 
planning personnel in particular) began working a future mission as soon as a mission 
was completed.  The heavy flight-to-flight work load with little or no “down time” 
between mission completion and preparation for the next flight made it difficult to 
capture experiences and lessons learned through memos, formal reports, and 
presentations.
9
  Third, the work culture at the time of the Apollo Program appears to have 
valued formal documentation more than the work culture in the shuttle era.  Contractors 
appear to have been required by NASA to prepare formal reports more than during the 
Shuttle or even Orion Programs.  The fourth reason, already mentioned, was that much 
Apollo documentation was informal memos and formal reports written using complete 
sentences and paragraphs while bullet charts were preferred during the Shuttle and Orion 
Programs. 
 
Formal reports containing technical detail in historical context written by technical 
personnel for a technical audience were helpful for rapidly gaining insight into the 
requirements, systems design, mission activities and flight performance results from 
previous flight programs.
10,11
  Such insight is required to determine if algorithms, 
                                                 
9
 The book History of Space Shuttle Rendezvous (JSC-63400, Revision 3) contains a chapter titled “STS-
130 Mission to the ISS.”  It is a 28 page knowledge capture chapter detailing a typical shuttle mission to the 
ISS from a rendezvous and proximity operations perspective.  The author performed much knowledge 
capture (email, Mission Control console notes, presentations, informal interviews) during the mission as he 
worked the flight.  The chapter was researched and written during the two months following the February 
2010 mission.  Memories of crew members, Mission Control personnel, and the crew were fresh, resulting 
in excellent feedback to the author on the draft.  Performing knowledge capture, research, and writing 
concurrent with and immediately after the events of interest resulted in a higher quality document than 
could have been created by an effort conducted many months or years after the flight.   
10
 Excellent examples of informative technical reports with historical context from NASA’s aeronautics 
research are: 
Day, Richard E., Coupling Dynamics in Aircraft: A Historical Perspective, NASA-SP-532, NASA 
Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards, California, March 1997. 
Day, Richard E., Energy Management of Manned Boost-Glide Vehicles: A Historical Perspective, 
NASA/TP-2004-212037, NASA Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards, California, May 2004. 
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requirements, lessons learned, and mission flight techniques from previous programs are 
applicable to a new development and flight program.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
11
 The five volumes that detail the MIT Instrumentation Laboratory (later called the Charles Stark Draper 
Laboratory) guidance, navigation, control, and software contributions to the Apollo Program are also good 
examples. 
MIT's Role in Project Apollo, Volume 1 Project Management, Systems Development, Abstracts and 
Bibliography, Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, R-700-VOL-1, October 1971. 
MIT's Role in Project Apollo, Volume 2: Optical, Radar, and Candidate Subsystems, Charles Stark 
Draper Laboratory, R-700-VOL-2, NASA-CR-141898, March 1, 1972. 
Hall, E. C., MIT's Role in Project Apollo, Volume 3: Computer Subsystem, Charles Stark Draper 
Laboratory, R-700-VOL-3, NASA-CR-151191, August 1, 1972. 
MIT's Role in Project Apollo, Volume 4: Inertial Subsystem, Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, R-700-
VOL-4, NASA-CR-141897, April 1, 1972. 
Johnson, M. S., and D. R. Giller, MIT's Role in Project Apollo, Volume 5: The Software Effort, Charles 
Stark Draper Laboratory, R-700-VOL-5, NASA-CR-140339, July 1, 1971. 
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Apollo and Space Shuttle Research Challenges 
 
Extensive bibliographies and references enable engineers to quickly identify conference 
papers or internal documentation of interest that can be obtained through NASA center 
libraries.  Such reports can save considerable time since cost and schedule constrained 
vehicle development places a heavy workload on technical and management personnel.  
One example is a JSC document providing abstracts of 37 technical reports written by Dr. 
William M. Lear from 1973 to 1995.
1
   
 
Some engineers may have difficulty understanding legacy reports if they are not familiar 
with the details of the flight program in question.  This makes it difficult to determine if 
the technical solutions, lessons learned, and challenges of a legacy program are relevant 
to a new program.  Personnel who grew up with the internet may not be familiar with the 
contents of paper libraries or papers that were published before the internet was created.   
 
Most technical and management personnel do not have an aptitude for extensive and time 
consuming research using primary and secondary source materials.  Librarians and 
archivists can speed-up research by locating primary and source materials for engineering 
personnel.  However, in some cases more primary source materials were collected than 
engineers had time to examine.   
 
Apollo and shuttle research experience showed that contractually deliverable documents 
are often preserved in government agency and corporate libraries. However, these 
documents do not contain the rationale used to create the contractual deliverables.  This 
decreases the usefulness of the documentation to future engineers.  Lower level 
documentation that provides insight into contractually deliverable documentation should 
be preserved. 
 
Many organizational libraries containing Apollo and shuttle documentation have 
disappeared for two reasons.  First, the need for floor or filing cabinet space resulted in 
libraries being recycled or sent to archive (and retrieving archived materials is not always 
easy).  Second, personnel who owned the libraries and were knowledgeable of and 
appreciated the contents retired or moved to other jobs.  They were no longer present to 
champion the need for the documentation or explain why the organizational libraries 
were of value. 
 
                                                 
1
 Dr. Lear made significant contributions in the areas of Kalman filtering, navigation, and dynamics during 
a 40 year career in the aerospace industry with TRW and Draper Laboratory.  He developed the Apollo 
Powered Flight Processor (PFP) that processed data from three or four ground tracking stations to 
determine the LM navigation state during Lunar Module powered descent and powered ascent.  The PFP 
was used by Mission Control to assess the health of the LM primary and backup computers and later 
formed the basis for Mission Control ground navigation during shuttle entry.  See Lear, William M., 
Abstracts of Technical Reports Written By William M. Lear, Ph.D., JSC-27368, NASA/JSC Aeroscience 
and Flight Mechanics Division, January 1996.   
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Much important and informative documentation was not in formal libraries, but was 
preserved by individuals on an ad hoc basis in desks, filing cabinets, and on computer 
hard drives.
2, 3
  Important documentation can be lost during government agency and 
corporate reorganizations and contract transitions.  However, personnel tend to retain the 
documentation that was most important to them. 
 
Organizations may have difficulty determining what documentation was sent to an 
archive in the past.  The cost of retrieving documentation from off-site archives can deter 
organizations from making use of archived resources.  Furthermore, archived resources 
may not be adequately indexed.  This forces the retrieval of large amounts of 
documentation (tens of linear feet) that require manual and time consuming examination 
to find relevant documents.  Documentation often arrives at archives with little or no 
information (such as abstracts) that would enable archivists to index it, catalog it, and 
assign keywords.  While archivists were very helpful, they are not subject matter experts 
and they depend on the organizations donating the documentation to provide descriptions, 
key words, and historical context. 
 
Although a few books cover shuttle development, an easily accessible timeline of shuttle 
development milestones from contract award in 1972 to the first shuttle mission STS-1 
(April 1981) and accompanying supporting documentation did not appear to exist.
4
  Such 
information may exist in primary or secondary documents preserved in archives.  Retired 
personnel remembered participating in programmatic reviews but none of the personnel 
interviewed could provide a complete picture of the number and types of reviews or the 
issues discussed and closed.
5
  Requirements rationale and descriptions of the mission 
planning process were difficult or impossible to find.  Rationale behind contingency 
                                                 
2
 At the end of the Shuttle Program shuttle rendezvous crew trainer Jorge Frank of United Space Alliance 
conducted extensive Apollo and shuttle research and knowledge capture.  He observed that it was difficult 
to find informal shuttle memos and presentations dating from approximately 1983 to 1993.  Frank believed 
that during this period much informal documentation was stored on floppy disks and desktop computers, as 
opposed to the traditional and exclusive use of paper.  By 1993 desktop computers were networked to 
external network hard drives, increasing the probability of preservation. 
3
 For a summary of experiences and lessons from an end of Shuttle Program effort to collect and archive 
documentation, see: Goodman, Doug, Chip Shepherd, and Al Godbout, “NASA Space Shuttle Program at 
Johnson Space Center Engineering Directorate Records Archival: Lessons Learned,” AIAA SPACE 2010 
Conference and Exposition, Anaheim, CA, August 30 - September 2, 2010. 
4
 Excellent overviews of Space Shuttle development are: 
Heppenheimer, T. A., Space Shuttle Decision, 1965-1972 (History of the Space Shuttle, Volume 1), 
Smithsonian Books, Washington, DC, 2002. 
Heppenheimer, T. A., Development of the Space Shuttle, 1972-1981 (History of the Space Shuttle, 
Volume 2), Smithsonian Books, Washington, DC, 2002. 
Jenkins, D. R., Space Shuttle – The History of the National Space Transportation System – The First 100 
Missions, Specialty Press Publishers, North Branch, MN, 2001. 
5
 This is not unusual.  In 1971 Stages to Saturn author Roger Bilstein commented during an interview of 
NASA Marshall Space Flight Center Aero-Astrodynamics Laboratory Director Ernst D. Geissler that he 
was having difficulty determining the dates of major decisions made concerning the design of the Saturn 
launch vehicles, even though it had only been 10 years since the decisions were made.  See Ernst D. 
Geissler interview, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, September 7, 1971, located in the Stages to Saturn 
History Project, Oral History Collections, University of Alabama Huntsville Library.  Bilstein, Roger E. 
Stages to Saturn: A Technological History of the Apollo/Saturn Launch Vehicles, NASA SP-4206, NASA, 
Washington, DC, 1980 and 1996.  Reprinted by The University Press of Florida, 2003. 
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procedure development and software changes was difficult to locate. Flight Software 
Change Requests (CRs) usually survive without the supporting documentation that details 
CR rationale, development, and testing.  Source code can be an important reference for 
algorithms even if computers can no longer execute the source code. 
 
In 2009 an Integrated Design Assessment Team (IDAT) was formed to study options for 
the design of the Orion parachute system.  The team sought input from Apollo veterans 
and surviving documentation.  Locating relevant documentation was challenging, but a 
large amount of documentation was eventually obtained.  Sources were NASA databases, 
Apollo veterans, and a Northrup archive.  Documents from the Northrup archive were 
scanned to obtain electronic copies.  The documents were thorough, well written, and 
important sources of information.  Input from Apollo veterans was valuable during the 
IDAT activity and after. 
 
An example of adapting a legacy algorithm versus developing a new one concerns Orion 
entry guidance.  Apollo had a skip entry requirement to provide landing options in the 
event of undesirable weather conditions at the primary landing site.
6
  Although Apollo 
skip entry guidance was certified, it was never flown, due to the difficulty in flying 
manual skip entries in case of a computer failure, and due to navigation and guidance 
inaccuracies.
7
  Orion also had a skip entry requirement to permit landing at the same 
point on Earth for lunar landings at latitudes ranging from equatorial to polar.  The final 
phase of Apollo entry guidance was adopted for Orion due to its excellent performance.  
However, greater Orion computer capacity permitted Orion personnel developed a new 
skip entry guidance algorithm, used at altitudes higher than final phase guidance, with 
better performance than the legacy Apollo skip guidance algorithm.
8,9,10
  Analysis of the 
skip guidance problem required extensive searches to locate Apollo documentation. 
 
Much Apollo and early shuttle documentation survived but it was difficult for researchers 
to determine why reports were written or what was done based on the reports.  Interviews 
of personnel that possessed a sharp memory were useful for understanding the historical 
and programmatic context of documentation.  These personnel were able to fill in the 
gaps of knowledge of Apollo and early shuttle technical history.   
 
Some oral history transcripts were also examined.  The challenge of using interviews and 
oral history transcripts dated long after the events in question is that memories fade, 
                                                 
6
 Burton, John K., Introduction to Apollo Entry Guidance and Flight Performance, JSC-35020, NASA JSC 
Flight Design and Dynamics Division, July 2009.  Discussed in this document. 
7
 Graves, C. A., and J. C. Harpold, Apollo Experience Report: Mission Planning For Apollo Entry, NASA-
TN-D-6725, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center, March 1972. 
8
 Tigges, Michael A., Timothy Crull, Jeremy Rea and Wyatt Johnson, “Numerical Skip-Entry Guidance,” 
Guidance And Control 2007, Advances In The Astronautical Sciences, Volume 128, Univelt, Inc., San 
Diego, CA, 2007. 
9
 Bairstow, Sarah, and Gregory Barton, “Orion Reentry Guidance with Extended Range Capability Using 
PredGuid,” AIAA Guidance, Navigation and Control Conference and Exhibit, Hilton Head, South Carolina, 
August 20-23, 2007. 
10
 Rea, Jeremy, and Zachary Putnam, “A Comparison of Two Orion Skip Entry Guidance Algorithms,” 
AIAA Guidance, Navigation and Control Conference and Exhibit, Hilton Head, South Carolina, August 20-
23, 2007.  
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technical details are forgotten, and stories change over time.  Oral history is most 
accurate when performed during or just after the events of interest.  Oral history is 
particularly valuable for researching the programmatic, political, policy, and cultural 
aspects of space flight.  Audio or video interviews may be the only practical way of 
capturing experiences and knowledge of busy technical personnel and program leaders 
who may not possess written communications skills. 
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Knowledge Capture via Software Documentation 
 
When the Space Shuttle was designed and built in the 1970s it had the most sophisticated 
software and avionics architecture ever designed for an aerospace vehicle up to that 
time.
1
  Flight performance of both the Primary Avionics Software System (PASS) and 
Backup Flight System (BFS) was been outstanding over the life of the program.
2, 3
   
 
Many factors could be cited for the success of the PASS and BFS flight software.  
Among them are robust development, testing, configuration control, issue investigation, 
and issue resolution processes.
4
  Multiple NASA and contractor organizations 
participated in various phases of requirements development, test scenario development, 
test data evaluation, and flight software issue resolution.  Extensive interaction of Shuttle 
Program personnel with skilled PASS (IBM, then Loral, then Lockheed Martin, and 
finally United Space Alliance) and BFS (Rockwell International, later Boeing) software 
specialists occurred throughout the ~35 year life of the shuttle software effort. 
 
Another success factor was the insight that NASA and contractor personnel had into the 
PASS and BFS equation level requirements and software functionality.  The primary 
documents that provided this insight was the configuration controlled PASS Functional 
Subsystem Software Requirements (FSSR, also known as Level C) and the BFS Program 
Requirements Document (PRD) documents.  The shuttle FSSRs and PRDs provide 
detailed and accurate equation level design and logic information that was written by 
engineers and understandable by engineers.
5
  These documents served as the 
authoritative, configuration controlled source of software algorithm insight for personnel 
across the Shuttle Program.  The FSSR and PRD volumes ensured that NASA and 
contractor personnel in various program elements could obtain the same level of software 
insight. 
 
The original FSSR and PRD volumes were written in the mid and late 1970s.  The 
volumes underwent extensive reviews by Shuttle Program personnel that did not write 
them.  Reviewers conducted thorough inspection of the requirements, equations, and 
interfaces.  These reviews and subsequent corrections by a large number of personnel 
enabled problems to be identified and corrected before flight software was written.  The 
                                                 
1
 Hanaway, John F., and Robert W. Moorehead, Space Shuttle Avionics System, NASA SP-504, National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1989. 
2
 Shuttle development veterans from the 1970s told the author that during the shuttle design phase people 
thought that if a vehicle was ever lost, it would most likely be due to software or some other avionics 
failure.  Such a loss did not occurr.  Challenger and Columbia were lost due to hardware failures. 
3
 Zimpfer, Douglas, Phil Hattis, John Ruppert, and Don Gavert, “Space Shuttle GN&C Development 
History and Evolution,” AIAA SPACE 2011 Conference & Exposition, AIAA, Long Beach, CA, September 
27-29, 2011. 
4
 Hickey, Christopher J., James B. Loveall, James K. Orr, and Andrew L. Klausman, “The Legacy of Space 
Shuttle Flight Software,” AIAA SPACE 2011 Conference & Exposition, AIAA, Long Beach, CA, 
September 27-29, 2011. 
5
 During the Apollo Program the equivalent documents for the Lunar Module and Command/Service 
Module software were the Guidance System Operations Plan (GSOP) volumes. 
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reviews also enabled many personnel, including software developers, to become familiar 
with the detailed software requirements and underlying theory of the algorithms.
6,
 
7
 
 
Research into flight software functionality was a continuous activity conducted by both 
experienced and new personnel in numerous Shuttle Program disciplines over the 30 year 
flight program.  There were many factors that drove this research – crew and ground 
procedure development, vehicle flight and ground test performance investigation, 
development of training documentation for the crew and other program personnel 
(analysts, flight controllers, etc.), simulator and mission planning tool development, 
identification and development of software upgrades, risk assessment, mission planning, 
trajectory design, etc.  For example, the shuttle training facilities used the same flight 
software that flew on the shuttles.  Detailed information on how the flight software 
worked was required by personnel who maintained the various models and other 
supporting software in the crew training simulators.  
 
FSSRs and PRDs were the primary source of as-coded documentation for PASS and BFS 
software.  FSSRs and PRDs, while not perfect, were invaluable aids to understanding 
PASS and BFS functionality since they were written by engineers, not software 
specialists.  There was a large community of non-software specialists that regularly used 
shuttle FSSR and PRD requirements as a part of their work.  FSSRs and PRDs enabled 
non-software specialists to acquire accurate and timely insight into how the PASS and 
BFS software worked and should perform.  The existence of the FSSRs and PRDs saved 
the Shuttle Program a considerable amount of time and money.  Furthermore, the easy 
access to accurate pseudo-code, interface tables, and paragraphs explaining functionality 
increased the knowledge and insight of Shuttle Program personnel.  This in turn enhanced 
mission success and safety of flight. 
 
The shuttle PASS FSSR contained useful flowcharts.  However, use of flow charts did 
not provide sufficient insight into all aspects of software functionality and logic needed 
by engineers outside the software process.  FSSR paragraphs detailing software 
requirements, interfaces, and functionality were invaluable.  Personnel needed accurate 
documentation of not only the as-coded equations, but the interface logic that tied the 
large number of software modules together.  The FSSRs provided this information.  
Unfortunately, the flight control FSSRs contained block diagrams but no paragraphs to 
explain the flight control logic.  This made flight control software research more difficult. 
 
Not all flight software questions could be resolved by the examination of FSSRs and 
PRDs by engineers external to the flight software development and maintenance 
organizations.  Some issues required the involvement of PASS and BFS software 
                                                 
6
 Shuttle software development organizations included many personnel with engineering, physics, and 
applied math backgrounds.  These personnel understood the guidance, navigation, and control theory 
underlying the software they were implementing. 
7
 For a discussion of the value of FSSRs during shuttle flight software development in the late 1970s see 
the comments by shuttle guidance sub-system manager Aldo Bordano in Compilation of Powered Explicit 
Guidance Papers, NASA/JSC Flight Dynamics Division, JSC-64694, February 2010, pages 40 to 42. 
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specialists.  These issues included questionable software performance that was formally 
documented in discrepancy reports as well as proposals for software changes. 
 
Frequently other questions arose did not warrant writing a flight software discrepancy 
report that would kick-off a formal investigation by the PASS or BFS development 
organizations.  Software specialists with access to HAL source code, additional 
documentation beyond the FSSRs, and Shuttle General Purpose Computers (GPCs) for 
running tests were able to provide answers and insight beyond what many engineers 
could acquire simply by studying the FSSR or PRD.   
 
Software development, maintenance, and flight-to-flight reconfiguration personnel had 
access to the following resources and documentation during software performance and 
functionality investigations: 
 
1) Shuttle computers running flight software. 
 
2) HAL source code. 
 
3) FSSRs and PRDs – Pseudo-code and detailed equation level requirements. 
 
4) Detailed Design Specification (DDS) – How the FSSRs and PRDs 
requirements were coded. 
 
5) Maintenance Specification – Higher level description of flight software 
architecture. 
 
6) Equations Derivations – If they could be found. They usually could not be 
located. 
 
However, there was a limit to how much investigation that members of the PASS and 
BFS software development and maintenance organizations could perform for other 
personnel in the Shuttle Program.  Such investigations could be performed only on a non-
interference basis, unless of course a performance issue arose that was documented 
through a flight software discrepancy report or some other formal documentation.  The 
existence of the FSSRs and PRDs enabled personnel outside the flight software 
community to conduct daily research and obtain answers without consulting the flight 
software organizations.  If the FSSRs and PRDs did not exist, the flight software 
community would not have been able address the large number of questions and need for 
information that arises as a part of mission preparation and execution.   
 
The shuttle PASS and BFS flight software was high quality source code and was the 
product of a strict and robust development process.  While extensive comments were 
included in the source code, the comments were not enough to enable shuttle personnel to 
understand how it functioned, investigate anomalous performance, or develop software 
changes.  Commented source code was not a substitute for the configuration controlled 
FSSR and PRD volumes.  Source code was not an effective or efficient way for engineers 
who were not software specialists to study software functionality.  While the PASS 
Detailed Design Specification and the Maintenance Specification were important 
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documents written and owned by the PASS flight software organization, they did not 
supply the same level of equation level insight as the FSSR.  The FSSR was more useful 
to non-software specialists and easier to understand than the PASS HAL source code, 
Detailed Design Specification, and the Maintenance Specification. 
 
On-board software for the International Space Station (ISS) was developed under the 
assumption that detailed FSSR type requirements documents were not required.  As a 
result software insight was a continual challenge during ISS flight operations.
8
  The ISS 
flight software was written in Ada (hand coded) and MatrixX.  ISS Mission Control 
organizations did not have enough personnel to employee software specialists devoted to 
Ada and MatrixX analysis.   MatrixX source code was difficult to understand unless one 
worked with it on a regular basis.  ISS flight controllers obtained flight software 
functionality and performance insight through the following means: 
 
1) Real time software tests run on the training simulators or the ISS 
Software Verification Facility (SVF).
9
  
 
2) Technical Description Document covering the mathematics in the 
attitude control software, last updated in 1996.   
 
3) Attitude determination mathematics added by Boeing engineers to the 
Software Requirements Summary (SRS) as an ad hoc form of knowledge 
capture. 
 
4) Social networking with McDonnell Douglas/Boeing ISS engineers and 
software developers.   
 
The effectiveness of gaining software insight through social networking depended on 
establishing and maintaining long-term relationships between ISS flight controllers and 
ISS engineering and software personnel.  The most effective relationships were ones that 
dated back to college days.  Not all ISS Mission Control disciplines were able to 
effectively establish such relationships.  The lack of detailed software documentation also 
made it difficult to train new ISS engineering personnel and investigate ISS performance 
anomalies. 
 
Shuttle flight software documentation provided invaluable and necessary insight into the 
safety critical software that was maintained by multiple generations of personnel over the 
30 year flight phase of the Shuttle Program.  The difficulty encountered by ISS Mission 
Control personnel trying to understand the ISS software points to the value of such 
documentation.  Future flight programs should possess flight software documentation that 
                                                 
8
 Email exchange between ISS Flight Director Michael Lammers and John Goodman dated November 23, 
2009.  Before becoming an ISS Mission Control Flight Director Mr. Lammers spent 10 years as an ISS 
flight controller specializing in flight software for Command and Control (C&C) and Guidance, 
Navigation, and flight Control (GNC). 
9
 The SVF was part of the Software Development and Integration Laboratory (SDIL), located at the 
NASA/JSC Sonny Carter Training Facility (SCTF), Building 920A.  It was the ISS version of the Shuttle 
Avionics Integration Laboratory (SAIL) in NASA/JSC Building 16.   
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is, at a minimum, equivalent to that in the Shuttle Program in terms of knowledge 
capture, readability, coverage of detail, and accessibility to personnel across a flight 
program. 
 
Knowledge capture during software development may be complicated by the adoption of 
a “software is self documenting” philosophy similar to that of the International Space 
Station.  Detailed software requirements documents may not be written in order to save 
development time and money.  However, this can limit the number of personnel that fully 
understand software functionality and theory to those that coded the software.  This may 
make it difficult for personnel not involved in software development to perform 
independent analysis and verification of the software.  Furthermore, this approach can 
result in software reviews that focus on high level software capabilities, rather than 
detailed equation level reviews of algorithms and interface requirements that occurred 
during the Apollo and Space Shuttle Programs.   
 
Specific requirements and contractual deliverables must exist for commenting source 
code, creating software insight memos, developing equation level requirements 
documents, and writing software design description documents.  Otherwise, personnel 
will not perform these activities due to the heavy development environment workload and 
fast-paced schedule.  Lack of such documentation will increase life cycle costs during 
mission planning, ground and on-board procedure development, software maintenance, 
and mission execution once the flight phase of a program begins.  Thorough 
understanding of software design, functionality, performance, and the theoretical basis of 
algorithms is an essential component of a good flight safety culture.  
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Orion Knowledge Capture Challenges 
 
Much vehicle design work conducted from Orion contract award (August 31, 2006) 
through the first flight of Orion will be of interest over the life of the Multi-Purpose Crew 
Vehicle Program.  Important Orion design information such as requirements rationale, 
operations concepts, and technical development history resided in many formats 
(presentations, emails, spreadsheets, informal memos, formal reports, status reports, 
meeting minutes), both electronic and hardcopy.  However, the budget, schedule, and 
employee work load constraints made it difficult to capture documentation in a manner 
that would provide historical context and ease of access to future engineers.   
 
The priority during vehicle development is to meet cost, schedule, and delivery 
(hardware, software, documentation) requirements, and keep the program sold and in 
business.  Knowledge capture may be seen as not contributing to successfully meeting 
these requirements and is therefore an optional activity.  Budget constraints, a fast paced 
development schedule, and heavy work load can prevent management from dedicating 
subject matter experts to knowledge capture, or creating knowledge capture tasks.   
 
Concerned personnel performed knowledge capture as a side activity on a non-
interference basis with respect to regular work.  These personnel had to be proactive and 
investigative to get access to informative documentation (emails, memos, presentations, 
etc.) and key personnel.  Not all of the primary sources needed to assemble a technical 
development history could be obtained and preserved during the normal course of 
business.  Fast paced vehicle development with continually evolving vehicle 
requirements and resource (schedule, time, and available personnel) constraints made it 
difficult for personnel to create detailed technical histories of sub-systems development. 
 
Email was an important means of communications among development team members 
that were geographically separated.  However, the large amount of email exchanged 
between team members, and NASA and contractor management in particular, was 
overwhelming.  More email was generated on a daily basis than personnel could read and 
respond to in a timely manner.  Limited use of email and greater use of face-to-face 
conversations, phone conversations, and informal memos was necessary to ensure 
effective communication in a timely manner.  However, conversations and informal 
memos did not communicate with as wide an audience as emails.  The necessary 
reduction in email traffic made it more difficult for some personnel to stay informed in 
the fast paced development environment.  This made performing knowledge capture 
more difficult.   
 
Summaries of recent decisions and updates on the status of tasks given by team leaders in 
meetings were useful for keeping personnel up to date, particularly in light of the 
reduction in email traffic.  This information was also documented in meeting minutes.  
Detailed meeting minutes were written and published for meetings of the Rendezvous, 
Proximity Operations, and Docking Working Group (RPOD WG) and the Guidance and 
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Targeting Working Group (GTWG).  These minutes will enable future Orion personnel 
to understand the context of presentation charts, the discussions that occurred during the 
presentations, and decisions made or actions taken based on the presentations. 
 
In May of 2008 an independent panel of seven spacecraft guidance, navigation, and 
control (GNC) specialists reviewed the on-orbit GNC software and trajectory designs 
developed by the Orion Flight Dynamics On-Orbit Mode Team.
1
  Digital audio 
recordings were made of each presentation to enable future Orion personnel to 
understand the development rationale behind the on-orbit GNC system.
2
  A total of 27.6 
hours of recording was performed.  A 99 page listener’s guide was written that correlated 
audio file elapsed time to each page in each presentation.
3
   
 
NASA leadership of the Orion On-Orbit Mode Team encouraged NASA and contractor 
personnel to document GNC analysis and software algorithms in formal Flight Dynamics 
team memos.
4
  A memo format and numbering system was implemented and a folder in 
an electronic repository for Flight Dynamics memos was created.  Bullet charts were not 
acceptable for formal documentation of analysis, requirements rationale, and theory 
underlying software algorithms.  Conference papers were also written during Orion 
development that performed high level knowledge capture.
5
   
 
Like Apollo and shuttle documentation, most Orion documentation provided little or no 
historical context such as why the document or presentation was written and what actions 
were taken.  Presentations are typically written for a specific meeting with a specific 
                                                 
1
 Mode Team – Multiple Organization Design Environment Team 
2
 Digital audio recordings were made since the GNC specialist that conducted this task had audio recording 
experience and did not possess video equipment.  A tight schedule and limited budget prevented the team 
from using professional video personnel and equipment.  
3
 Goodman, John, Listener’s Guide to Orion Orbit GNC Peer Review Recordings, United Space Alliance, 
May 27, 2008. 
4
 This was also known as the Orbit Mode Team.  One example of such a memo is: 
D’Souza, Christopher, “A Primer on the Orion Absolute Navigation UDU Filter,” EG Technical Brief, 
EG-DIV-11-24, NASA/JSC Engineering Directorate, February 28, 2011. 
5
 Many Orion and Ares I guidance, navigation, control, and trajectory papers were presented at AIAA and 
AAS conferences.  Six examples are: 
Brazzel, Jack P., Chris D’Souza, Peter T. Spehar, Fred D. Clark, Chad Hanak and Tim Crain, “NASA 
CEV Rendezvous Proximity Operations and Docking GN&C Analysis,” Guidance and Control 2007, 
Advances in the Astronautical Sciences, Volume 128, Univelt, Inc., San Diego, CA, 2008, pages 607-630. 
Crain, T., M. Begley, M. Jackson, and J. Broome, “GN&C System Design in a Mass Reduction 
Exercise,” Guidance and Control 2008, Advances in the Astronautical Sciences, Volume 131, Univelt, Inc., 
San Diego, CA, 2008, pages 407-424. 
Dukeman, Greg, “Rapid Trajectory Optimization for the ARES I Launch Vehicle,” AIAA Guidance, 
Navigation and Control Conference and Exhibit, Honolulu, Hawaii, August 18-21, 2008. 
Chambers, Robert, “Seven Vehicles in One: Orion GN&C,” Proceedings of the AIAA SPACE 2008 
Conference and Exposition, San Diego, California, September 9-11, 2008. 
Marchand, Belinda, Michael Weeks, Chad Smith, and Sara Scarritt, “Onboard Autonomous Targeting for 
the Trans-Earth Phase of Orion,” AIAA Journal of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics, Vol. 33, No. 3, May-
June 2010, pages 943-956. 
Jackson, Mark, “Orion Flight Performance Design Trades,” AIAA Guidance, Navigation, and Control 
Conference, Toronto, Ontario, August 2-5, 2010. 
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objective, not to provide background information and context (historical, technical, 
programmatic) to future researchers.  Status reports should reference presentations and 
reports so that future readers will understand the context and significance of them.  Status 
reports and meeting minutes should be preserved along with supporting documentation.  
Information harvested from status reports, emails, and presentations can be combined 
into sub-system development timelines or informal memos. 
 
The significant amount of Orion documentation stored electronically on various computer 
networks provides the possibility that more Orion development documentation could be 
preserved than Apollo and shuttle development documentation.  Electronic document 
repositories are useful for capturing presentations, informal memos, and formal reports 
during vehicle development.  Furthermore, some electronic repositories require 
purchasing user licenses.  Budget limits and organizational boundaries within a flight 
program can prevent access by personnel with a legitimate business need for the 
documentation.  Organization of documentation (such as folder hierarchy and names) 
within a repository can either make it difficult or easy to find documents of interest.  
Electronic storage can eliminate the floor and filing cabinet space issue encountered with 
shuttle paper documentation.  However, computer memory may become an issue.  If 
electronic archives are to be preserved technical or management personnel could be 
designated as archive owners.  This is not a day-to-day librarian function, but the owner 
could ensure that the existence of, contents of, and value of the archives remain within 
the corporate memory of government agency and contractor personnel.  This function 
would include working with the information technology personnel to ensure that changes 
in operating systems and computer applications do not compromise the ability to access 
the documentation.  It is difficult to predict what future changes could occur in software 
applications and operating systems. 
 
A proven algorithm from a past flight program can be implemented in new software 
incorrectly by engineers that are not familiar with its underlying theory and operation.  
Even proven algorithms that have been in use for decades need to be thoroughly 
documented to lower technical risk during future adaptation and re-use.  Legacy Apollo 
and Space Shuttle documentation was useful for educating Orion personnel on the 
underlying theory of heritage algorithms used by Orion. 
 
Some Apollo and Space Shuttle memos contained equations providing important 
theoretical insight or algorithms that could be incorporated in analysis software.  
However, some memos did not present derivations of important equations or references 
to where derivations could be found.  Attempts to reverse engineer derivations are time 
consuming and not always successful.  An inability to verify a derivation and identify and 
understand any assumptions made will lead engineers to not use the equation or 
algorithm in question, even if there is potential for cost and schedule savings by re-using 
it.   
 
NASA personnel overseeing Orion GNC algorithm development encouraged engineers to 
write formal memos detailing algorithms developed for the Orion on-board software.  
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Many of these formal memos contained appendices with derivations of the algorithms.
6
  
This ensures that future engineers will have a good understanding of the algorithm and 
makes future reuse of the algorithm more likely. 
 
A second example of documenting derivations and underlying theory concerns a 
technical note published in a journal in 1984 by a former NASA Ames engineer.  The 
note described a new algorithm for solving Lambert’s problem for orbital burn targeting.7  
The algorithm used an innovative new form of Kepler’s equation that was presented 
without derivation.  However, the references provided for the new form of Kepler’s 
equation were privately published memos that readers of the journal would most likely 
not be able to locate.  In 1996 the author published a second technical note in the same 
journal that presented the complete derivation of the new form of Kepler’s equation.8  
The 1996 technical note also provided useful theoretical insight needed to fully 
understand the algorithm presented in the 1984 technical note.  The author stated in the 
1996 note that: 
 
“Although the transformed equation has already been presented in 
essentially its final form and used as a basis for development of a new and 
efficient p-iteration algorithm [8], as noted above, its derivation has not 
been fully documented in an archival journal.” 
 
This action by the author makes it more likely that the algorithm will be used in the 
future and that future engineers will benefit from the theoretical insight provided by the 
derivation and rationale behind the new algorithm. 
 
 
                                                 
6
 One example is D’Souza, Christopher, “A Primer on the Orion Absolute Navigation UDU Filter,” EG 
Technical Brief, EG-DIV-11-24, NASA/JSC Engineering Directorate, February 28, 2011. 
7
 Boltz, Frederick W., “Second-Order p-iterative Solution of the Lambert/Gauss Problem,” Journal of the 
Astronautical Sciences, Vol. 32, No. 4, October-December 1984, pages 475-485. 
8
 Boltz, Frederick W., “General Transformation of Kepler’s Equation for p-Iterative Solution of the 
Lambert/Gauss Problem,” Journal of the Astronautical Sciences, Vol. 44, No. 1, January-March 1996, 
pages 21-37. 
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Space Shuttle Knowledge Capture Approach 
  
This chapter contains discussions of the knowledge capture approach taken during the 
research and writing of the reports detailed in this document.   
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The Knowledge Capture and Management Process 
 
The knowledge capture and management process can be divided into four steps executed 
in the following order:
1
 
 
1. People 
2. Content 
3. Process 
4. Information Technology (computers, software) 
 
Many corporations and government agencies begin implementing knowledge capture and 
management starting with step 4, the identification, procurement, and integration of 
computer hardware and software.  A process (step 3) is then created that fits with the 
information technology.  Then content to place in the knowledge management process is 
defined (step 2).  Finally, personnel are identified that can provide and create knowledge 
capture content for the knowledge management process (step 1).  This reverse approach 
(steps 4, 3, 2, 1) may be due to a false perception that subject matter experts cannot be 
identified and knowledge capture cannot be performed unless optimal corporation or 
agency wide knowledge management processes are in place using the latest information 
technology. 
 
This reverse approach results in little overall benefit to technical and lower level 
management personnel.  Optimal knowledge management process creation and 
implementation (step 3) and information technology (step 4) require resolving 
corporation or agency wide policy, process, budget, and information technology issues.  
This can require a considerable amount of time and budget.  Establishing a large 
corporate or agency wide integrated process may not accomplish much knowledge 
capture in a cost and schedule constrained environment.    Corporations and government 
agencies typically have far more personnel skilled at process creation (step 3), process 
management, and information technology (step 4) than they do technical subject matter 
experts (step 1) that possess the written, verbal, and graphic communications skills need 
to effectively perform knowledge capture (step 2).   
 
An initial focus on the processes of sharing and retrieval, corporate or agency level 
processes and policy issues, benchmarking, trade studies, or abstract knowledge 
management theory that is difficult to understand and apply limits that actual knowledge 
capture and management that is performed by technical personnel.  The difficulties 
encountered with a reverse approach can make knowledge capture and management 
harder than it really is.  Significant expenditure of time and resources on steps 3 and 4 
without results visible to and useful by lower level management and technical personnel 
could discourage personnel from initiating and participating in knowledge capture and 
management efforts.  
                                                 
1
 Lee, Jim, “Using Knowledge Management to Improve Project Success,” presentation to the NASA 
Johnson Space Center Technical Speakers Forum, July 7, 2010.  At the time of the presentation Jim Lee 
was Knowledge Management Practice Leader at APQC (the American Productivity & Quality Center). 
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The focus of personnel that researched and wrote the reports listed in this document was 
on steps 1 and 2.  Step 1, people, involved identifying subject matter experts that 
possessed the verbal, writing, and graphic communications skills needed to perform 
knowledge capture.  These steps can be performed by subject matter experts and their 
immediate management using existing processes and information technology resources 
without waiting for corporate or agency level process, policy, and information technology 
issues to be resolved.  Subject matter experts and lower level management have little 
ability to influence or resolve the budget, policy, and process issues involved with steps 3 
and 4.   Identification of subject matter experts with knowledge capture skills and 
creation of knowledge capture documents and other media is critical in a cost and 
schedule constrained environment.  Steps 3 (process creation) and 4 (information 
technology) could be worked later.  Authors of the reports detailed in this document and 
other United Space Alliance personnel devoted time and resources to actually doing 
knowledge capture rather than studying knowledge management theory, benchmarking 
knowledge management processes, or performing information technology trade studies. 
 
While a significant amount of knowledge capture (steps 1 and 2) can be performed at the 
lower levels of corporations and government agencies, visible leadership and support 
from senior management is needed to ensure the success and continuity of such efforts, 
particularly for the creation and implementation of knowledge management processes 
(step 3) and identification, procurement, and integration of information technology (step 
4).  
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Leading and Managing People is the Key to Effective Knowledge Capture 
 
Performing effective knowledge capture is not an information technology problem, but a 
people skills and work culture challenge.  The most effective knowledge capture is 
accomplished by subject matter experts who possess visual, verbal, inquiry, and written 
communication skills. Unfortunately, not all subject matter experts possess these skills. 
 
There is a perception that with optimal taxonomies and the latest search engine 
technology one will obtain effortless and instantaneous access to answers for whatever 
questions arise.  This is an unrealistic expectation.  In reality, while taxonomies and 
advanced search engines are helpful, they are not a replacement for intellectually curious 
personnel who enjoy learning and performing research.  Technical personnel need to 
spend time learning what information sources are available and what they contain.  The 
better understanding one has of sources and a topic the easier it is to find applicable 
information.  Searching for answers is like detective work.  The more experience one has 
the better they are at it.  Even with the Internet, social networking and search engines, 
research still requires time and work.  And developing research skills takes time. 
 
Good engineers and managers are interested in developing the technical, leadership, and 
communication skills of personnel and avoiding single point failures in terms of key 
subject matter experts.  Organizations will always have an attrition rate, personnel will 
change and documentation may be lost during re-organizations, and all programs come to 
an end at some point.   
 
The best forms of knowledge capture are well-written and informative memos, 
presentations, formal reports, meeting minutes, and status reports that provide technical 
information, decision rationale, lessons learned, and requirements in the context of 
spacecraft system or overall program history. 
 
Below are four key components of knowledge capture and management.  All involve the 
leadership and management of people: 
 
Discipline – Place key knowledge and lessons in status reports, meeting 
minutes, presentations, procedures, training materials, memos, formal 
reports, etc. Share verbally in various forums. Refer to presentations, 
memos, and formal reports in status reports so that the significance of the 
documentation will be understood years later. 
 
Communication Skills – Interviewing, discussion, and writing skills are 
required to effectively research and communicate lessons learned and 
technical history.  Communication skills are just as important as technical 
skills such as deriving equations. 
 
People Management – Identify subject matter experts with good 
communication skills and use them in knowledge capture and 
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management efforts. People who have observed and experienced the 
negative impact of corporate knowledge loss or worked on challenging 
projects are more motivated to participate in such efforts, document 
lessons learned and experiences, and mentor other employees. 
 
Leadership – All levels of management should encourage and reward 
employees who identify and document lessons and preserve knowledge. 
Stress the importance of developing and demonstrating good 
communication skills. 
 
Previous generations of engineers (before 1980) understood theory well, but did not have 
fingertip access to powerful computing resources.  The use of slide rules and nomography 
forced engineers to be proficient at devising analytical and empirical solutions.  This was 
very important for creating software that would run in the low capacity computers of the 
1960s and 1970s.
1
  These engineers knew theory well enough that they could predict the 
results of computer simulations.  Aerospace industry careers from about 1930 to 1970 
included many development projects providing extensive hands-on experience with 
design, hardware production, software development, and flight testing.  This extensive 
experience enabled engineers to internalize the trade study process.  The availability of 
desk-top computers with powerful mathematical, engineering, and simulation software 
packages can greatly increase the productivity of engineers.  However, there is a danger 
that current and future engineers may rely too heavily on computer results and not take 
the time to understand the underlying theory and physics of the problem so that the 
accuracy and validity of computer results can be confirmed.  Formal technical 
documentation detailing underlying theory and interpretation of results can provide 
engineers with educational experiences even if senior technical personnel are not 
available to mentor them.  
 
Engineers should be intellectually curious, constantly asking questions and motivated to 
spend time doing the work to get the answer and understand it, and understand what 
factors can change the answer.  Good engineers are not interested in simply getting an 
answer to check the item off on the to-do list and meet a deadline.  They perform and 
contribute meaningful analysis, and do not limit their contributions to mere meeting 
attendance.  Subject matter experts who posses these qualities along with good 
communication skills can perform the most effective knowledge capture. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Computer resources were so scarce in the 1960s that many engineers had to get management permission 
to use computer time. 
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Documenting Lessons Learned and Experiences 
 
Documentation is not just a record for contemporaries (other engineers and management 
at the time of publication), but serves an educational purpose for future engineers.
1
  A lot 
can be learned from failures and development projects that encountered challenges.
2
  
Most lessons learned that are documented and shared are from bad things that happened 
in a flight program.  However, much can learned from positive experiences as well.  It is 
important not to overlook factors for success and lessons from projects that successfully 
mitigated risk and met goals.  Identifying lessons from successful projects can be more 
challenging.  Personnel tend to spend more time analyzing projects with lots of problems 
than projects that successfully overcame challenges without negatively impacting mission 
success, schedule, and budget. 
 
Many that are concerned with knowledge capture and management focus on just-in-time 
organizational learning through verbal communication (i.e. social networking).  This type 
of effective communication is crucial on a daily basis to ensure the success of spacecraft 
development and flight operations.  However, the effectiveness of social networking is 
limited by the capacity and accuracy of human memory.  Much knowledge and 
experiences of interest to spacecraft developers and operators is technically detailed and 
years or decades old.  Formal reports and informal memos written in complete sentences 
with tables, illustrations, and references can preserve technical detail accurately and place 
it in historical context for future generations of engineers and managers.  Well written 
status reports are a convenient way of recording technical history and preserving the 
historical context of presentations and reports.  Charts with bullet points and spreadsheets 
omit much background information that may be understood by the original audience, but 
will not be known to future researchers.  This makes charts and spreadsheets difficult to 
learn from.  The knowledge capture approach taken by the authors of the reports detailed 
in this document preferred formal documents written in paragraphs and ruled out the use 
of charts with bullet points and spreadsheets.
3
 
 
Program management should provide flexible guidelines for knowledge capture, as 
opposed to rigid requirements.  Guidelines enable subject matter experts and their 
immediate management to tailor knowledge capture efforts to a specific audience while 
taking into consideration available skills, time, and budget.  Subject matter experts that 
possess verbal, written, graphic, and inquiry communications skills should be permitted 
                                                 
1
 For an interesting overview of spacecraft development lessons from the 1960s, many of which still apply 
today, see R. D. DeLauer, and E. O. Marriott, “Lessons of the 1960's in Spacecraft Development,” AIAA 
Space Program Issues of the 70's Meeting, Seattle, WA, August 28-30, 1967. 
2
 Dennehy, Cornelius J., Steve Labbe, and Kenneth L. Lebsock, “The Value of Identifying and Recovering 
Lost GN&C Lessons Learned: Aeronautical, Spacecraft, and Launch Vehicle Examples,” AIAA Guidance, 
Navigation, and Control Conference, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, August 2-5, 2010. 
3
 For a discussion of the problems with bullet chart communication see Tufte, Edward R., The Cognitive 
Style of PowerPoint: Pitching Out Corrupts Within, Second Edition, Graphics Press, Cheshire, CT, 2006.  
Dr. Tufte’s books Envisioning Information (1990), Visual Explanations (1997), The Visual Display of 
Quantitative Information (2001), and Beautiful Evidence (2006) (all published by Graphics Press) are 
excellent sources of information on visual communication, data presentation and analysis.  See also page 
191 of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report, “Engineering by Viewgraphs.” 
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to apply those skills to knowledge capture projects.  On the other hand, subject matter 
exports that do not possess these skills should not be expected to perform knowledge 
capture at a high level.  Writing extensive, book length works or even formal reports may 
not be possible in some cases.  Execution of knowledge capture at the subject matter 
expert level should not be contingent on completion of lengthy development and 
implementation of high level knowledge management policies, processes, and acquisition 
of information technology (computer hardware and software). 
 
It is important to document experiences as well as lessons learned. Experiences can be 
just as informative and are important for transferring knowledge to less experienced 
engineers and managers. Experiences contain insight that cannot be found in a textbook 
or a list of lessons learned.  Furthermore, it is easier to tell a story and capture the 
attention of a reader or listener with an experience than with discrete lessons learned.
4
  
People also tend to remember stories better than isolated statements and facts.  Lessons 
and experiences should be clearly and objectively communicated so that they will be easy 
for future personnel to understand.  Some attempts to communicate lessons are too 
technical and abstract to be understood by someone that was not a participant.  Providing 
technical and historical background and context is an important part of effectively telling 
a story.
5
 
 
Effective knowledge capture does not rely solely on the memories of people.  Primary 
sources such as formal reports, memos, presentations, status reports, and meeting minutes 
are valuable sources of information.  Interviewing skills are necessary for drawing key 
insights and lessons (tacit knowledge) out of subject matter experts that do not possess 
knowledge capture skills.  When performing knowledge capture some subject matter 
experts often focus on commonly known history, systems descriptions, or process 
descriptions. They may not recognize key insights (tacit knowledge) that are important 
for a less experienced person to gain understanding. What is obvious to a senior subject 
matter expert may be a revelation to a person with less experience. 
 
Below are four steps for the process of capturing and managing lessons learned and 
experiences.  Some organizations focus most of their efforts on the capture and 
sharing/retrieval steps.  However, adequate attention must be paid to the identification 
and creation steps to ensure that quality knowledge is captured that will be informative, 
educational, and useful.  Ideally, authors should be technical subject matter experts or 
managers who have the communication and reasoning skills to perform the identification 
and creation steps.  Advice on how to execute the below steps can be sought from people 
                                                 
4
 For an excellent example of an experience report with lessons learned see: Nufer, B., Hypergolic 
Propellants: The Handling Hazards and Lessons Learned From Use, Joint JANNAF Interagency 
Propulsion Committee, 25th Safety and Environmental Protection Joint Subcommittee Meeting, December 
6-10, 2010, Orlando, FL.  Available from the NASA Technical Reports Server on the internet at the time of 
this publication. 
5
 The System Failure Case Studies published by the NASA Safety Center are excellent four page 
summaries of mishaps.  Including in each is background information, a description of the incident, photos 
and illustrations, proximate causes, underlying issues, and applications to future NASA missions.  At the 
time of this publication the case studies resided on the NASA Process Based Mission Assurance website on 
the internet. 
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with previous knowledge capture and writing (such as technical writers and editors) 
experience when defining tasks and negotiating knowledge capture requirements.   
 
1. Identification – Conduct research to identify lessons. This involves 
primary source materials and interviews. Research and interviewing skills 
are required to identify key knowledge, experiences, and lessons. 
 
2. Creation – Create a story or narrative using the results of the research 
in step 1.  This requires skills in reasoning and in verbal, written, and 
visual communication. 
 
3. Capture – Document the story in some form of media (formal report, 
informal memo, presentation, training material, procedure, case study 
discussion outline, video, audio, etc.). 
 
4. Sharing/Retrieval – Some examples are discussion forums (Pause and 
Learn (PaL), peer assist, case studies, etc.), or retrieving some form of 
media from a library, website, or electronic database.
6
 
 
The success of knowledge capture and management efforts depends on where most of the 
work is focused, and by keeping the efforts simple.  Knowledge management policy 
creation, process implementation, and information technology procurement is easier if an 
organization has already demonstrated some success at knowledge capture.  When 
starting knowledge capture efforts use existing forums for verbal sharing and software 
tools for electronic capture and electronic sharing and retrieval steps, rather than delaying 
efforts until new process and policies are in place and budget is allocated for 
procurement.  Much knowledge capture and management can be accomplished by 
working smarter with resources that are already available. 
 
 
                                                 
6
 For information on the NASA Pause and Learn (PaL) process see: Rogers, Edward W., “Knowledge 
Management: Case Study of Building a Learning Organization: Goddard Space Flight Center,” in System 
Health Management: with Aerospace Applications, edited by Stephen B. Johnson et al, John Wiley & Sons, 
Ltd, Chichester, United Kingdom, 2011, pages 65-75. 
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Choosing Documentation to Preserve 
 
Much knowledge capture involves identifying key documentation and preserving it in a 
fashion that will facilitate preservation and retrieval by future personnel that may not be 
familiar with what was saved.  In a cost and schedule constrained environment such an 
approach may be preferable to capturing and documenting tacit knowledge, particularly if 
the subject matter experts do not possess the communication skills to create knowledge 
capture documents. 
 
Many basic questions about previous spacecraft and missions can be answered by simple 
documents such as press kits, mission ground-rules and constraints documents, and crew 
timelines.  Presentations are often not as valuable as formal reports since they do not 
place the topic in the overall context of the program.  The reader is often left with 
unanswered questions after reading a presentation.  These are: 
 
1.  Why was this presentation created?   
 
2.  What discussion was conducted during the presentation?   
 
3.  What action was taken, if any, as a result of the presentation?   
 
The same is true of memos and reports.  The presentations, meeting minutes, status 
reports, memos, and formal reports that are worth saving contain answers to some or all 
of these questions.  Documentation selected for preservation should tell a story. 
 
Rather than approaching document preservation from the perspective of a database gate 
keeper applying strict requirements, the goal should be to facilitate educational 
experiences for future engineers, within resource limitations (budget, schedule, computer 
system capacity, etc.).  The fundamental objective of researching legacy programs is to 
answer the question, “What from the past can be applied to the current project to solve a 
problem or mitigate risk?”  Research is also conducted to help those less familiar with 
space vehicle design and spaceflight operations understand the complexity and challenges 
involved.  The below questions can help pinpoint what to save for future researchers. 
 
1. What did we do? 
 
2. Why did we do it? 
 
3. When did we do it? 
 
4. How did we do it? 
 
5. Why did we do it that way? 
 
6. What happened? 
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7. What challenges did we encounter? 
 
8. What did we learn? 
 
9. Is there something we wish we would have done differently? 
 
The above questions can help identify what memos, presentations, and documents are 
worth saving.  However, short memos (one to three pages) may need to be created that tie 
the documents together and help future engineers see the big picture, or how the 
documents all fit together to tell a  story.  People who have worked in a program for 
many years may understand the connections when looking at documentation.  However, 
these connections may not be obvious to future personnel. 
 
It is impossible to predict what documentation will be important to someone 5 or 30 years 
from now.  One cannot anticipate what the future programs will be, what their 
requirements will be, or what problems future personnel will be trying to solve.  
Something that is trivial or obvious to someone working in a flight program may not be 
understood or recognized by someone in the future.  Things that are easily understood by 
current personnel may be confusing to future personnel.  It is impossible to predict what 
the questions or points of confusion will be when future personnel attempt to solve 
technical problems and research legacy documentation.   
 
Obviously, not all documentation generated by a flight program can be saved.
1
  Binders, 
filing cabinets, and folders on computer hard drives may be loaded with data but with 
little or no supporting documentation to explain the data and provide context.  There may 
be a cryptic memo or informal notes accompanying the data.  Those that generated the 
data may not even fully recall what purpose the data served or be able to recall key 
insight that the data provided.  Such data may not be worth preserving. 
 
If some documents are already preserved in formal archives (such as a NASA center 
library) they do not need to be saved in another archive.  References to such documents 
can be included in document overviews that are written to help future researchers 
understand the importance of the document collection.  However, if a document is 
already saved in a formal archive and it is an important part of the technical story, it 
could be saved again in a different place to make the job of future researchers easier.  
Including the important evidence and sources in one archive makes the future research 
process easier and saves time, and does not require a large amount of time of the 
personnel performing the initial knowledge capture.  Meeting minutes and associated 
presentations should be saved together.  Researchers are often trying to put together a 
story using primary and secondary sources that are not as extensive or complete as they 
would like for them to be.  How useful archived documentation is to future personnel 
depends on how well it tells the story. 
                                                 
1
 An extensive document selection process and archive effort was created and executed by USA Flight 
Design and Dynamics personnel at the end of the Shuttle Program.  See Lufkin, Douglas (Barrios 
Technology), “Shuttle Knowledge Capture, Flight Design & Dynamics,” presentation to the Shuttle 
Knowledge Capture Working Group, March 11, 2010. 
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Near the end of the Shuttle Program the United Space Alliance Flight Design and 
Dynamics department created 17 compilation JSC documents to preserve selected 
primary source material in an organized fashion.  A compilation volume consists of a 
large number of memos, reports, and presentations on a particular topic.  Twelve of the 
volumes concern rendezvous, one navigation, two Draper Laboratory papers, and the 
final two concerned Space Shuttle Powered Explicit Guidance (PEG).  A document 
overview chapter written by the editor provides the reader with a road map to 
understanding the content and significance the memos, reports, and presentations. Well 
written and informative introductions and document overviews are the key to making 
document compilations useful and understandable to future engineers.  This road map 
explains the significance of the materials and places them in historical context in terms of 
vehicle development and missions that were flown.  Placing the volumes in the 
NASA/JSC Scientific and Technical Information Center (STIC) under a JSC document 
number preserved key memos, reports, and presentations that might otherwise end up in 
the recycling bin.  While these materials could have been archived, they would have been 
less accessible to future engineers performing research.  The compilation volumes were 
scanned to Portable Document Format (PDF), bookmarked, and distributed on DVD to 
provide on-demand mouse click access that facilitates learning experiences for engineers.  
This is a low cost method of preserving key primary source materials for future 
generations of engineers.  The volumes also include lists of references to other related 
documents located in the NASA/JSC STIC.  
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Lessons Learned and Best Practices Reports 
 
This chapter concerns reports whose primary content was lessons learned and the stories 
associated with them.  Three of the four reports pertain to knowledge management and 
educating engineering and management personnel on lessons learned to promote 
development of a good flight safety culture. 
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Lessons Learned From Seven Space Shuttle Missions 
 
 Goodman, John L., Lessons Learned From Seven Space Shuttle Missions, NASA 
Contractor Report NASA/CR-2007-213697, NASA Johnson Space Center, 
January 2007.  52 pages. 
 
During the 1992 to 1998 time period the author participated in the investigation of five 
incidents of anomalous shuttle flight software performance. None of the incidents 
presented a threat to safety of flight.  The author had accumulated and preserved a large 
amount of primary source material and was motivated to write the report to pass on 
lessons that could reduce risk in spaceflight programs.  The source material included 
memos and presentations representing the technical expertise and observations of many 
team members. The author also interviewed other personnel that were involved. 
 
The 52 page NASA contractor report details the causes, mission impacts, and lessons 
learned from the five incident investigations that the author participated in plus two other 
investigations that the author was not involved in.  Descriptions of each of the seven 
missions were included. Factors that led to the successful mitigation of the problems were 
also highlighted.  While some technical details had to be omitted to avoid export control 
concerns, the lessons learned were presented in their entirety. 
 
Table of Contents 
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 Rendezvous Target Failure On STS-41B 
 Rendezvous Trajectory Dispersion On STS-32 
 Rendezvous Lambert Targeting Anomaly On STS-491 
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 Zero Doppler Steering Maneuver Anomaly Before STS-59 
 Excessive Propellant Consumption During Rendezvous On STS-692 
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Shuttle Flight Software Anomalies on STS-91
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1
 For primary source material see Goodman, John L., (editor), STS-49 Lambert Targeting Anomaly and 
Aftermath, JSC-49710, Flight Design and Dynamics Division, NASA JSC, May 2003.   
2
 For primary source material see: 
Goodman, John L., (editor), Space Shuttle Lambert Cyclic Guidance, JSC-49709, Flight Design and 
Dynamics Division, NASA JSC, May 2003.  
Meissen, Thomas J., Space Shuttle Lambert Guidance Improvement, SCR 92843/93009 OI-32, JSC-
49830, NASA/JSC Flight Design and Dynamics Division, October 28, 2006.   
3
 For primary source material see Goodman, John L., (editor), Space Shuttle GPS Lessons Learned, JSC-
49712, NASA JSC Mission Operations Directorate, June 2003.   
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Flight Safety Education for Current and Future Space Flight Programs 
 
 Goodman, John L., and David P. Dannemiller, “Flight Safety Education For 
Current and Future Space Flight Programs,” Proceedings of the AIAA Space 2006 
Conference, AIAA, Reston, VA, 2006.  21 pages. 
 
This paper reviews the rationale behind and methodology of the NASA/JSC Mission 
Operations Directorate (MOD) Flight Safety Seminars.  The Flight Safety Awareness 
Seminar has been held as a part of the yearly NASA Johnson Space Center Safety Day 
activities since October of 1998. The seminar was motivated by the STS-91 (June 1998) 
GPS incident.
1
  The seminar’s primary purpose is to increase flight safety awareness 
through discussion of accidents, their causes, and lessons learned.  In addition, the 
seminar is designed to motivate and empower personnel to identify potential risks and 
raise issues in a constructive manner so that they can be investigated before a mishap 
occurs.  Particular attention is paid to what forms of intervention could have prevented 
the accident and what lessons can be applied to the NASA/JSC mission operations 
environment so future mishaps can be prevented.
2
   
 
The paper provides details on several incidents examined in the seminars.  These include 
the September 2004 Genesis spacecraft crash, loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia, the 
June 1996 Ariane 5 Flight 501 launch failure, the August 1997 loss of the Lewis 
spacecraft, the April 1994 Blackhawk helicopter friendly fire incident over the northern 
Iraqi no-fly zone, the January 1995 X-31 crash at Edwards Air Force Base, the March 
2001 crash of a Gulfstream III in Aspen, Colorado, and the November 1999 Texas A&M 
bonfire collapse. 
 
Topics Covered 
 
 Introduction 
 Shuttle Upgrade Challenges Led to Establishment of the Safety Seminars 
 Seminar Source Material 
 Seminar Methodology 
 Seminar Evolution, Lessons Learned and Best Practices 
 Expansion of the Flight Safety Education Effort Since 1998 
 Conclusions 
 Appendix A – Nine Incidents Covered in the Seminars 
 Appendix B – Incident Investigation Report Completion and Publication Dates 
 
                                                 
1
 Goodman, John L., Lessons Learned From Seven Space Shuttle Missions, NASA Contractor Report 
NASA/CR-2007-213697, NASA Johnson Space Center, January 2007.   
2
 The Columbia Accident Investigation Board stated on page 183 of their report that “NASA emphasizes 
safety as well, but training programs are not robust and methods of learning from past failures are 
informal.”  The MOD Flight Safety Seminars, begun over four years before the loss of Columbia and her 
crew, are a formal method of training personnel to recognize potential flight safety risks and promote a 
healthy flight safety culture.   
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Best Practices for Researching and Documenting Lessons Learned 
 
  Goodman, John L., Best Practices for Researching and Documenting Lessons 
Learned, NASA Contractor Report NASA/CR-2008-214777, NASA Johnson 
Space Center, March 2008.  20 pages. 
 
When USA Flight Design began to perform navigation and rendezvous lessons learned 
research for the NASA/JSC Flight Design and Dynamics Division, no documents could 
be found providing guidelines or best practices for conducting such an activity. As a 
result, lessons learned, factors for success, and observations were collected from all 
participants (NASA and contractor, management and technical) after publication of 
several reports. These interviews were used to define best practices for researching and 
documenting lessons learned and experiences.  The purpose of this report is to assist 
government and contractor organizations to perform knowledge management of lessons 
learned and experiences. 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 Introduction 
 Defining Report Requirements, Project Organization, and Schedule 
 Collection and Analysis of Source Material 
 Writing and Integrating the Report  
 Review and Revision of the Report  
 Conclusion  
 References 
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Knowledge Capture and Management for Space Flight Systems 
 
 Goodman, John L., Knowledge Capture and Management for Space Flight 
Systems, NASA Contractor Report NASA/CR-2005-213692, NASA Johnson 
Space Center, October 2005.  24 pages. 
 
This report stressed the importance of knowledge capture and provided examples of low 
cost knowledge capture and management activities performed at the NASA Johnson and 
Kennedy Space Centers. 
 
Topics Covered 
 
 Introduction 
 Knowledge Capture and Management Is Important 
 Why Knowledge May Not Be Captured or Accessible 
 Legacy Vehicles and Systems 
 Managing Talent and Changing Culture 
 Improving Knowledge Capture and Management In 
      Future Programs 
 Conclusion 
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Navigation and GPS Reports 
 
The Space Shuttle GPS integration, flight test, and certification was a successful project 
that resulted in improved and excellent on-board navigation performance.  The project 
also provided many lessons learned due to the technical and programmatic challenges 
that had to be overcome.  Six of the reports covered in this chapter concern the GPS 
project.  Two cover shuttle navigation software upgrades not associated with GPS.  
Navigation Technical History With Lessons Learned also covers non-GPS on-board and 
ground navigation. 
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Space Shuttle GPS Operating Characteristics 
 
 Goodman, John L., and Mark C. Morris, Space Shuttle GPS Operating 
Characteristics, 19th Edition, JSC-35082, NASA/JSC Flight Dynamics Division, 
July 2011.  194 pages. 
 
GPS Operating Characteristics contained information on GPS receiver functionality, 
performance, definitions of commands and data presented to the crew and Mission 
Control personnel.  It also contained shuttle software details, and information on other 
GPS receivers and GPS/Inertial Navigation System (INS) (or SIGI) units under 
consideration by NASA/JSC for use in space. This included the International Space 
Station and X-38 GPS receivers. Information included in the document was harvested 
from interaction with the GPS receiver vendor and other shuttle GPS personnel, post 
flight analysis, meeting discussions, emails, and presentations. 
 
Background on This Report 
 
Several weeks before the first flight of the Miniaturized Airborne GPS Receiver/Shuttle 
(MAGR/S) GPS receiver on STS-79 (September 1996) Ascent/Entry Guidance and 
Procedures Officer (GPO) Kelly Beck asked John Goodman to provide information on 
GPS receiver data and other parameters. Although the MAGR/S was not yet certified for 
operational use there were contingency procedures for it to be used with the Backup 
Flight System (BFS) in a worst case navigation scenario. In response to the request a four 
page memo titled OI-25 GPS Display Definitions was distributed to shuttle GPS and 
Mission Control Center personnel on September 3, 1996. 
  
Due to the difficulty in obtaining formal documentation on MAGR/S functionality the 
memo quickly became a living knowledge capture document and was eventually renamed 
GPS Operating Characteristics. By the time of the publication of the 18th edition on 
May 24, 2001, it had grown from 4 pages to 174 pages. Each edition of the document was 
distributed to Shuttle Program personnel concerned with GPS and shuttle navigation in 
general. 
  
While GPS Operating Characteristics was widely used by Shuttle Program personnel, it 
was never an official document. In support of end-of program knowledge capture Mark 
Morris of the United Space Alliance Flight Design and Dynamics Department prepared 
an updated 19th edition for publication and preservation as a JSC document in July of 
2011. 
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Space Shuttle GPS Compilation 
 
 Goodman, John L., (editor), Space Shuttle GPS Lessons Learned, JSC-49712, 
NASA JSC Mission Operations Directorate, June 2003.  206 pages. 
 
Most of the compilation consists of presentations concerning the June 1998 STS-91 GPS 
incident.
1
  These presentations concern the causes of the incident and corrective actions 
that were taken.  They were presented to senior Shuttle Program management. It also 
contains shuttle GPS lessons learned papers and presentations.  The lessons learned were 
later included in the NASA contractor report GPS Lessons Learned From the ISS, Space 
Shuttle, and X-38.
2
 
 
                                                 
1
 Goodman, John L., Lessons Learned From Seven Space Shuttle Missions, NASA Contractor Report 
NASA/CR-2007-213697, NASA Johnson Space Center, January 2007.   
2
 Goodman, John L., GPS Lessons Learned From The ISS, Space Shuttle and X-38, NASA Contractor 
Report NASA/CR-2005-213693, NASA Johnson Space Center, November 2005.   
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Improvement of Space Shuttle Time to Node Computation 
 
 Goodman, John L., Improvement of Space Shuttle Time to Node Computation, 
JSC-49766, NASA JSC Mission Operations Directorate, July 2003.  56 pages. 
 
The Space Shuttle Relative Navigation (REL NAV) crew display (also called SPEC 33) 
contained a countdown timer, called time-to-node, to the next orbiter crossing of the 
target spacecraft orbital plane.  This could be used by the crew after the Mid-course 
Correction-1 (MC-1) burn as cue for zeroing out-of-plane velocity by manually 
commanding Reaction Control System (RCS) jet firings. 
 
The original (late 1970s) computation for time-to-node differenced current and previous 
values of out-of-plane position, divided by the time difference, to determine out-of-plane 
velocity.  State vector updates from Kalman filtering of rendezvous radar data resulted in 
an inconsistency in the position values used to compute out-of-plane velocity, rendering 
the time-to-node parameter unusable by the crew. 
 
A Flight Software Change Request (CR) was approved for flight software Operational 
Increment-30 (OI-30) on September 6, 2001, to improve the accuracy of the time-to-node 
computation.  The improvement involved replacing the numerical computation of out-of-
plane velocity with an exact analytical solution.  This document detailed the derivation of 
the new out-of-plane velocity equation, and the changes made to the shuttle flight 
software.  The first flight of OI-30 was the STS-114 flight of Discovery (July-August 
2005). 
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Space Shuttle Rotation, Nutation and Procession (RNP) Matrix Computation 
 
 Brownd, Joseph E., Space Shuttle Rotation, Nutation and Procession (RNP) 
Matrix Computation (CR 92329E), JSC-49834, September 2003.  54 pages. 
 
This report documented the theory behind an upgrade to the Space Shuttle on-board flight 
software Rotation, Nutation and Procession (RNP) matrix algorithm.  The new on-board 
RNP computation method eliminated the need to compute up to ten RNP matrices and 
associated time epochs per year, and eliminated the need to patch the flight software in 
the event of concerns with RNP staleness and associated navigation errors.  The first 
flight of the new algorithm, in software version OI-29, was on Atlantis (STS-110) in 
April of 2002. 
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GPS Lessons Learned From the ISS, Space Shuttle, and X-38 
 
 Goodman, John L., GPS Lessons Learned From The ISS, Space Shuttle and X-38, 
NASA Contractor Report NASA/CR-2005-213693, NASA Johnson Space 
Center, November 2005.  120 pages. 
 
This report is a compilation of most material written by the author on Global Positioning 
System (GPS) navigation from January 2001 to November 2005.  It details the GPS 
navigation integrations on the Space Shuttle, ISS, and X-38.  Lessons learned from these 
three programs are presented. 
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Background on This Report 
 
In the early 1990s the Shuttle Program began to re-investigate the possibility of replacing 
the onboard Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) units used during entry with GPS 
receivers.
1
 The Program favored the use of an existing GPS receiver designed for, and 
flight-proven by, military aviation. Such a receiver had the benefits of authorized 
operation, ability to accept inertial aiding, resistance to jamming, and an existing logistics 
support base. At the time there were no space GPS receivers in production that were 
designed to support the entire Shuttle flight envelope (powered flight during ascent, on-
orbit, atmospheric re-entry) with these design features, nor were any of the existing space 
receivers compatible with the Shuttle from a form-and-fit perspective. Use of avionics 
and other devices from atmospheric flight applications was not new to the Shuttle 
Program. Many systems on the Shuttle were adapted from other atmospheric flight 
vehicles in the 1970s. However, GPS receivers contained far more software than previous 
avionics devices that had been adapted for use on the Shuttle. The Shuttle GPS upgrade 
project encountered more technical and project management challenges than anticipated, 
                                                 
1
 Studies of using GPS navigation on-board the Space Shuttle were also conducted in the mid and late 
1970s, and during the 1980s. 
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despite the rapidly increasing and successful use of GPS technology worldwide in 
numerous applications. 
 
By 1996, concerns about the software intensive nature of the Shuttle GPS receiver led 
concerned personnel (both engineering and management) to seek experiences and lessons 
learned from other flight programs. There was a considerable amount of material 
available advocating the use of off-the-shelf software and hardware, but at the time (mid 
1990s) little guidance was available on selection, integration, testing, and certification of 
software intensive off-the-shelf or modified-off-the-shelf units. Papers concerning the use 
of off-the-shelf hardware and software were very abstract, difficult to understand, and 
provided little practical guidance on selection and implementation. GPS project personnel 
found it difficult to locate relevant lessons learned from projects that encountered 
technical and programmatic challenges. 
 
Formal reports from accident investigations and spacecraft failures were available 
(Ariane 501, Mars Climate Orbiter, Mars Polar Lander, Lewis, WIRE, etc.) and were 
reviewed by some GPS project personnel. Some of these reports highlighted challenges 
that were also of concern to Shuttle GPS project members. These challenges included 
software and spacecraft development using software and hardware originally developed 
for other flight programs. However, project personnel were not able to effectively 
communicate that parallels existed between the causes identified in the accident reports 
and problems observed in the Shuttle GPS project. 
 
In June of 1998, during the flight of STS-91, interaction between a malfunctioning GPS 
receiver and two previously unknown software anomalies in the Shuttle flight computer 
resulted in a loss of communication with Discovery for approximately 30 minutes.
2
  The 
STS-91 incident and the difficulty in locating useful and applicable lessons learned from 
other projects motivated personnel to formally document lessons learned from the Shuttle 
GPS project. 
 
Many project GPS project personnel had been identifying technical and programmatic 
issues and extracting lessons learned from them for several years, but until the STS-91 
loss of communications incident no lessons learned had been formally documented. Soon 
after STS-91 several program internal lessons learned presentations were created. The 
collection of observations and lessons learned was conducted so as to protect the identity 
of the contributors. Some of the internal presentations were not widely distributed due to 
the sensitive nature of the lessons and observations. A NASA reorganization of the 
Shuttle GPS project made use of these observations and lessons. Shuttle GPS was 
certified for operational use in 2002, after a three-year delay. 
 
Later, further collection of GPS lessons learned was performed by United Space Alliance 
so that they could be disseminated to a wider NASA and aerospace industry audience. 
Lessons were collected from the STS-91 investigation presentations, discussions at 
                                                 
2
 Goodman, John L., Lessons Learned From Seven Space Shuttle Missions, NASA Contractor Report 
NASA/CR-2007-213697, NASA Johnson Space Center, January 2007.   
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meetings, and interviews with managers and engineers on an individual basis. Lessons 
from the ISS and X-38 GPS projects were later collected in the same manner. 
 
The GPS project consisted of a small team of NASA and contractor personnel. Many 
project members had participated in the project for most of its existence. Due to the 
organizational and technical challenges that were encountered, lessons learned were a 
frequent topic of discussion long before an attempt was made to document them. 
Memories were fresh, so identifying and harvesting lessons learned was straightforward, 
either through interviews or by simply listening to discussions during meetings.  
However, not all technical personnel fully understood the programmatic decisions made 
by Shuttle Program management early in the GPS project (before 1996). This factor had 
to be taken into account when evaluating their observations. 
 
Seven conference papers and one magazine article were published, highlighting various 
aspects of the Shuttle, ISS, and X-38 GPS projects, in addition to lessons learned.
3
 Once 
drafts of papers were completed, they were provided to both Mission Operations and 
Engineering Directorate personnel (NASA and contractor, management and technical) for 
review. This ensured that all aspects of the project were accurately documented and that 
the papers represented the views of JSC personnel and their supporting contractors in 
various organizations. Since the papers were written for external publication, care was 
taken to write the lessons to allay export control concerns. Subject matter experts 
provided quick, insightful, and accurate reviews of draft papers. Some material from the 
first paper was placed in the NASA Lessons Learned System soon after publication to 
ensure availability of the lessons to a wider audience.
4
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 Goodman, John L., “Parallel Processing: GPS Augments TACAN in the Space Shuttle,” GPS World, 
Volume 13, Number 10, October 2002. See also http://www.gpsworld.com/government/aviation-
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4
 Goodman, John L. Lessons Learned From Flights of “Off the Shelf” Aviation Navigation Units on the 
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The externally published papers were later integrated and re-formatted into a 120 page 
NASA Contractor report GPS Lessons Learned From The ISS, Space Shuttle and X-38.  
The report was made publicly available through the NASA Technical Reports Server on 
the internet. In addition to the publicly available papers, many internal presentations 
concerning project lessons learned, the STS-91 GPS incident, and the subsequent 
investigation were compiled into a JSC document and placed in the JSC technical library 
to ensure access and preservation of original source material.
5
 
 
The author later encouraged the NASA/JSC Engineering Directorate to publish a NASA 
Technical Publication documenting lessons learned from the ISS GPS project.
6
   This 
report provides more of a procurement and development perspective on ISS GPS 
challenges encountered by NASA/JSC. 
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 Goodman, John L (editor), Space Shuttle GPS Lessons Learned, JSC-49712, Flight Design and Dynamics 
Division, Mission Operations Directorate, NASA Johnson Space Center, June 2003. Available from the 
NASA/JSC Scientific and Technical Information Center. 
6
 Gomez, Susan, Three Years of Global Positioning System Experience on International Space Station, 
NASA Technical Publication NASA/TP-2006-213168, NASA Johnson Space Center, August 2006. See the 
NASA Technical Reports server at http://ntrs.nasa.gov/, or the Johnson Technical Reports server at 
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Navigation Technical History with Lessons Learned 
 
 Goodman, John L., Toni Deboeck, Daniel Dyer, Robert Goyen, Michael 
Nishizaki, Crystal Ramirez, Devon Sanders, Sherrie Santos, Matthew Shaver, and 
Samuel Welsh, Navigation Technical History with Lessons Learned, JSC-63653, 
Flight Design and Dynamics Division, Mission Operations Directorate, NASA 
Johnson Space Center, April 2007.  382 pages. 
 
This report covers human spacecraft navigation techniques, historical navigation 
architectures, lessons learned, flight performance history, evolution of navigation 
software, and legacy best practices from previous spaceflight programs.  It was 
researched and written for Constellation Program risk mitigation.   
 
Table of Contents 
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 Shuttle Ground Navigation Software Development 
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 Concluding Thoughts 
 References 
 
Background on This Report 
 
Over an eight-month period a team of Mission Operations navigation specialists located, 
obtained, and studied hundreds of documents from the Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Space 
Shuttle, and ISS Programs.  Source material was abundant and dated back to the late 
1950s. The team also took advantage of a large body of primary source material that had 
been collected by a previous project. This saved a considerable amount of time. These 
documents included internal NASA reports, memos, presentations, and published 
technical papers and books. However, there was no central repository for historical 
technical documentation; therefore, identifying, locating, and obtaining certain historical 
documents was a tedious and time consuming process. Source material was listed in a 
references section by flight program. Available source documents were placed on 
compact disks and delivered to the NASA customer along with the final report. This will 
permit future researchers to access original source documents in a timely manner. 
 
On-board and ground system anomalies were included to enable personnel, including 
those new to the human flight program, to identify long-term trends of technical 
anomalies and organizational challenges. The document was designed to provide the 
Constellation Program (and future development and flight programs) ready access to such 
information, as much of the source material on this topic is not centrally located or 
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organized. The document also enables new personnel, who may never have had the 
opportunity to work with veteran engineers that developed on-board and ground 
navigation software, architecture, and techniques in the 1960s and 1970s, to gain insight 
into accomplishments, milestones, lessons learned, and best practices from that era. The 
382 page report was used as a reference by NASA and contractor personnel working in 
the Orion and Constellation programs. 
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Operational Aspects of Space Shuttle GPS 
 
 Goodman, John L., “Space Shuttle Navigation in the GPS Era,” Proceedings of 
the National Technical Meeting 2001, Institute Of Navigation, Long Beach, CA, 
January 22-24, 2001.  17 pages. 
 
 Goodman, John L., and Carolyn A. Propst, “Operational Use of GPS Navigation 
for Space Shuttle Entry,” IEEE/ION PLANS 2008 Conference, Monterey, CA, 
May 5-8, 2008.  13 pages. 
 
Space Shuttle Navigation in the GPS Era describes how Space Shuttle on-board and 
ground navigation was and was not changed by the addition of GPS receivers to the 
Space Shuttle.  Pre-GPS and post-GPS shuttle navigation is described by flight phase 
(ascent and post insertion, orbit coast, rendezvous, deorbit, and entry).  The integration 
architecture, state replacement, is described along with the rationale for its selection.  
Also covered are integration architectures that were not chosen, receiver modification for 
the Space Shuttle, flight test results, flight tests of the Space Integrated GPS/INS (SIGI) 
unit, and lessons learned. 
 
Operational Use of GPS Navigation for Space Shuttle Entry describes the operational use 
of one GPS receiver and three TACAN units by the Space Shuttles Atlantis and 
Discovery, and operational use of three GPS receivers (no TACANs) by Endeavour.  The 
single string test flights (called GPS ramp up) by Atlantis and Discovery leading to the 
first flight of no TACANs and three GPS receivers by Endeavour on STS-118 (August 
2007) are described.  Plans for nominal and contingency use of single string GPS is 
covered.  The paper also includes a comparison of entry navigation on the Mercury, 
Gemini, Apollo Command Module, and Space Shuttle vehicles.   
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Ionopheric Scintillation and GPS 
 
 John L. Goodman and Leonard Kramer, “Scintillation Effects On Space Shuttle 
GPS Data,” Proceedings of the ION 2001 National Technical Meeting, Long 
Beach, CA, January 22-24, 2001, pages 742-752. 
 
 Leonard Kramer and John L. Goodman, “Ionospheric Instability Observed in Low 
Earth Orbit Using Global Positioning System,” AIAA Journal of Spacecraft and 
Rockets, Vol. 42, No. 1, January-February 2005, pages 124-131. 
 
Two articles on the challenges of GPS navigation appeared in Aviation Week & Space 
Technology magazine in December 1997.
1  
As a result of these articles the NASA/JSC 
Mission Operations Directorate held a series of splinter Ascent/Entry Flight Techniques 
meetings in early 1998 to review the approaching replacement of shuttle TACAN units 
with GPS receivers.  The splinters were chaired by Ascent/Entry Flight Director and 
future Shuttle Program manager Wayne Hale.  Mr. Hale later informed Shuttle Program 
management that there was no significant reason to delay replacement of TACAN units 
with GPS receivers.
2
  However, there were several recommendations for further 
investigative work, one of which was a better understanding of ionospheric scintillation 
at the approaching solar maximum and the potential impact on shuttle GPS navigation 
performance.  During the remainder of 1998 United Space Alliance personnel 
investigated ionospheric scintillation effects on GPS receiver performance with the 
assistance of GPS and ionospheric scintillation specialists in industry and academia. 
 
On the evening of November 3, 1998, during the flight of STS-95, NASA Mission 
Control Ascent/Entry Guidance and Procedures Officer Glenn Pogue noted two periods 
of noisy GPS velocity. The phenomenon was observed on two consecutive orbits, as the 
Shuttle Discovery was off the west coast of South America, during the early evening 
hours. The noisy velocity was in the range of 5 to 7 feet/second for about 5 minutes. 
Based on the scintillation study conducted the previous spring, ionospheric scintillation 
was identified as the most probable cause.  The papers Scintillation Effects On Space 
Shuttle GPS Data and Ionospheric Instability Observed in Low Earth Orbit Using Global 
Positioning System detail the analysis that was performed to confirm that the velocity 
noise was caused by ionospheric scintillation.  The physics underlying ionospheric 
scintillation is reviewed and why the velocity noise occurrences were judged not to 
present a risk to safety of flight or mission success once GPS replaced TACAN.
3
                                                 
1
 Nordwall, Bruce D., “GPS Success Sparks New Concerns for Users,” and “Solar Storms Threaten GPS 
Reception,”  Aviation Week & Space Technology, Vol. 147, No. 22, December 1, 1997, pages 58-60 and 
pages 61-62. 
2
 Hale, N. W., “Operations Review: GPS Replacement for TACANs,” Flight Director Office, NASA JSC 
Mission Operations Directorate, March 13, 1998. 
3
 The velocity noise was found to be a function of shuttle velocity.  In the unlikely event that ionospheric 
scintillation occurred during landing the noise would be too low to negatively impact navigation 
performance.  While incorporation of GPS state vectors into the shuttle navigation system while on-orbit 
was certified the Shuttle Program chose not to develop nominal procedures for on-orbit incorporation to 
save money, since the Program was scheduled to end in 2010.   
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Navigation Papers by Gene Brownd and Dr. Leonard Kramer  
 
 Goodman, John L. (editor), Navigation Papers by Gene Brownd and Leonard 
Kramer, JSC-35084, Flight Dynamics Division, Mission Operations Directorate, 
NASA Johnson Space Center, June 2011.  1178 pages. 
 
This compilation preserves memos and presentations by Gene Brownd and Dr. Leonard 
Kramer from the years 1994-2005.  Mr. Brownd and Dr. Kramer worked in the United 
Space Alliance Flight Design and Dynamics Department Navigation group.  Both were 
recognized and highly regarded experts on Kalman filtering.  Mr. Brownd’s papers 
concern Kalman filtering, Space Shuttle GPS receiver navigation performance, 
quaternions, GPS antenna modeling, GPS receiver navigation error modeling, and IMU 
alignment.  Dr. Kramer’s presentations and memos detail the theoretical development and 
functionality of the Mission Control Spacecraft Position Optimal Tracking (SPOT) filter.  
SPOT was used in Mission Control to provide accurate orbit determination of the Space 
Shuttle and ISS by filtering on-board GPS receiver position vectors.   
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Rendezvous and Proximity Operations Reports 
 
Rendezvous and proximity operations were an integral part of many shuttle missions 
from June 1983 through the end of the program in July of 2011.  The successful 
development and demonstration of rendezvous techniques during Project Gemini was 
essential for the later success of the Apollo lunar missions, as well as the Skylab and 
Apollo/Soyuz missions.  However, shuttle rendezvous and proximity operations 
presented new technical challenges through the life of the Shuttle Program.  These reports 
provide insight into these challenges and how they were met.  The compilation volumes 
preserve a considerable amount of primary source documentation. 
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Space Shuttle Rendezvous and Proximity Operations Experience Report 
 
 Goodman, John L., and Kelli S. Wiuff, Space Shuttle Rendezvous and Proximity 
Operations Experience Report, JSC-49626, Flight Design and Dynamics 
Division, Mission Operations Directorate, NASA Johnson Space Center, February 
2003.  192 pages. 
 
Under the Space Launch Initiative (SLI) Program, NASA tasked the USA Flight Design 
and Dynamics department to conduct an eight-month effort (beginning in June of 2002) 
to collect experiences, lessons learned, and best practices from 20 years of planning and 
flying Space Shuttle rendezvous and proximity operations missions.  
 
The report contains an introduction explaining the report, an executive summary, 
strengths and accomplishments of shuttle rendezvous and proximity operations, an 
overview of rendezvous and proximity operations phases, and a historical overview of 
shuttle rendezvous and proximity operations development.  Two chapters provide generic 
descriptions of various aspects of vehicle systems and mission planning using examples 
from shuttle missions.  The examples are detailed in the Supporting Evidence chapter.  
Tables of in-flight anomalies and shuttle rendezvous mission history were also included. 
An extensive bibliography cited open literature papers related to shuttle rendezvous and 
proximity operations. The report was provided to rendezvous personnel working on the 
Orion Program. 
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Background on This Report 
 
A significant amount of historical material (post flight reports, mission planning memos, 
flight techniques presentations, etc.) were collected and examined. This material 
occupied several shelves of binders and filing cabinet drawers.  Most of the material in 
the report was obtained through examination of the collected documentation.   
 
Some lessons learned were explicitly identified in primary source documents, particularly 
those dating from 1983 and 1984, when the first shuttle rendezvous and proximity 
operations missions were flown.  Other lessons were extracted and formulated after 
careful consideration of the material and discussion with Mission Operations subject 
matter experts. A tracking form was developed for use during the research phase to 
record lessons learned and observations. The form contained entries for tracking number, 
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author, date, title, lesson learned, relevant background information, and references. The 
USA document author and USA project manager had a close relationship with the NASA 
customer. This permitted frequent discussion of project status and timely resolution of 
report requirements and scope issues.  
 
The definition of a lesson learned found on the NASA Lessons Learned Information 
System website in 2002 was used by the project to identify material to be placed in the 
report: 
 
A lesson learned is knowledge or understanding gained by experience. 
The experience may be positive, as in a successful test or mission, or 
negative, as in a mishap or failure. Successes are also considered sources 
of lessons learned. A lesson must be significant in that it has a real or 
assumed impact on operations; valid in that it is factually and technically 
correct; and applicable in that it identifies a specific design, process, or 
decision that reduces or eliminates the potential for failures and mishaps, 
or reinforces a positive result. 
 
A best practice was defined as a factor taken into consideration when defining mission 
plans, flight rules, procedures, and vehicle design. A lesson learned may become a best 
practice and the original lesson may be forgotten over time.  Many subject matter experts 
felt that documenting only lessons learned would exclude much valuable information. 
Therefore, the report was titled an “experience report.” Historical material was added to 
place the material in context. Originally, a distinction was to be made in the report 
between lessons learned, experiences, best practices, and observations (a catch-all 
category for anything that did not fit in the other three categories). A limited schedule 
prevented these distinctions from being made in the report. 
 
A 170 page draft report was published for review in early December of 2002. Reviewers 
included NASA and USA personnel in the Flight Design and Dynamics organization, as 
well as USA personnel in rendezvous and proximity operations crew training. Of those 
subject matter experts that participated in interviews and draft reviews, a few had 
rendezvous and proximity operations experience dating back to the 1960s and 1970s. A 
slightly larger number were involved in rendezvous and proximity operations before the 
loss of Challenger. 
 
Four formal review meetings were held over a four week period in January and February 
of 2003.  Numerous discussions over email, phone, and in person were also held. Release 
of the first draft of the experience report prompted reviewers to supply constructive 
criticism. While meetings to discuss the draft were useful, the most valuable input was 
obtained from redlined copies or emails containing comments on the drafts. Far more 
lessons and experiences were harvested in this fashion than from interviews.   
 
Unlike shuttle GPS, rendezvous and proximity operations concerned multiple systems 
and disciplines, which resulted in more subjects to investigate as compared to the GPS 
project. Rendezvous and proximity operations subject matter experts found it more 
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difficult to identify lessons learned than GPS project personnel, since they did not have 
the benefit of a project that faced serious technical and programmatic challenges to 
motivate them to identify lessons learned.  The experience report went through 
considerable change before publication as a JSC document.  Based on discussion during 
the reviews, the report was reorganized to improve its legibility. Headings and 
subheadings were redefined. Generic summaries for each subheading were written, with 
references to supporting evidence in the latter half of the document. The supporting 
evidence contained specific examples from which the generic statements were derived 
and cited the sources from which the evidence was obtained. 
 
During the research phase a considerable amount of shuttle rendezvous history material 
was obtained. Since an easily accessible and readable narrative history of shuttle 
rendezvous did not exist, a 17 page AIAA Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets article and a 
much longer JSC document was published.
1,2
   
 
                                                 
1
 Goodman, John L., “History of Space Shuttle Rendezvous and Proximity Operations,” AIAA Journal of 
Spacecraft and Rockets, Vol. 43, No. 5, Sept.-Oct. 2006, pages 944-959. 
2
 Goodman, John L., History of Space Shuttle Rendezvous, Revision 3, JSC-63400, Flight Dynamics 
Division, Mission Operations Directorate, NASA Johnson Space Center, October 2011. 
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Rendezvous and Proximity Operations Systems Integration 
 
 Goodman, J. L., and J. P. Brazzel, “Rendezvous Integration Complexities of 
NASA Human Flight Vehicles,” 32nd Annual AAS Guidance And Control 
Conference, Guidance and Control 2009, Advances in the Astronautical Sciences, 
Volume 133, Univelt, San Diego, CA, 2009.  17 pages. 
 
This paper was written to counter the perception that rendezvous, proximity operations, 
and docking is just about relative sensors and propellant optimal trajectories.  Topics 
covered include: 1) rendezvous missions and phases of rendezvous, 2) design, 
development, test and engineering, 3) chaser and target vehicle integration, 4) vehicle 
design, 5) integrating rendezvous and proximity operations systems, 6) contingency 
planning, and 7) integrated teams.  The paper also discusses rendezvous systems 
integration lessons learned from four case studies: 1) late addition of VHF ranging to the 
Apollo CSM, 2) late recognition of Space Shuttle plume impingement, 3) balancing 
automation, autonomy, and authority (Soyuz spacecraft), and 4) sensor risk reduction 
through flight testing. 
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Space Shuttle Rendezvous Training 
 
 Goodman, John L., Introduction To Space Shuttle Rendezvous Guidance, 
Navigation, and Control, Fourth Edition, JSC-49686, NASA JSC Flight Design 
and Dynamics Division, November 2009.  420 pages. 
 
This fully illustrated book is a high level introduction to rendezvous trajectories, relative 
navigation, burn targeting and guidance, and flight control.  It was used as a training and 
reference book by mission planning, Mission Control, and engineering personnel at 
NASA/JSC.  It was also provided to astronauts for supplementary reading.   
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Background on This Book 
 
Introduction to Space Shuttle Rendezvous Guidance, Navigation, and Control was 
originally written (mid 1991 to February 1993) to meet rendezvous training needs within 
the Rockwell Space Operations Company (RSOC) Level 8 guidance, navigation, and 
control flight software testing group.
1
   
 
Rendezvous training materials available circa 1986-1991 were difficult to use for training 
entry level engineers to perform verification of shuttle flight software.  Many new hires 
and some Shuttle Program veterans found rendezvous and proximity operations to be a 
difficult topic to understand.  Many aspects of rendezvous profiles, guidance, navigation 
and control were not covered in existing training books, nor did they tie the components 
of rendezvous and proximity operations together to give the trainee the big picture. 
 
The text, including style and content, was developed in response to lessons learned over 
five and a half years of training entry level engineers to perform rendezvous software 
verification and effectively interface with other elements of the Shuttle Program.  Most of 
the material in the 250 page first edition (published in February of 1993 as a STSOC 
                                                 
1
 Level 8 flight software testing was performed on the integrated mass memory for each shuttle mission. 
The testing was performed in the Software Production Facility, or SPF, at the Johnson Space Center. The 
SPF contained shuttle General Purpose Computers (GPCs, the AP-101B and later AP-101S). 
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document, STSOC-TM-001498) was taken from rendezvous training classes held for 
Level 8 analysts in the spring of 1991.   
 
The book was intended to allow engineering and management personnel to quickly come 
up to speed through the development of a visual rendezvous vocabulary.  Creating 
pictures required a thorough understanding of rendezvous design and flight software 
algorithms, necessitating authorship by a subject matter expert.  Pre-publication 
reviewers included Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) Flight Design and Crew 
Training personnel. 
 
Use of the book quickly spread to other NASA/JSC organizations outside of RSOC Level 
8 software verification, making it difficult to determine who was using it.  Although the 
target audience was technical personnel it was provided to Space Shuttle crews for 
supplementary reading. 
 
In May of 1999 the MOD Rendezvous Guidance and Procedures Office asked the author 
if an updated, electronic edition could be published.  The new edition would reflect 
rendezvous and docking with the International Space Station and the new rendezvous 
profile.  Work on the new edition began in the fall of 1999.  The book was rehosted from 
MacDraw to Powerpoint, graphics were cleaned up, more realistic crew displays were 
created, and 117 pages of new material were added.  The second edition was published 
on February 9, 2000, and a third edition with corrections was published on May 17, 2000.  
It was available online as a pdf file.  The third edition was used by some Orion and 
Constellation personnel as a reference for rendezvous GNC and trajectory concepts. 
 
The 420 page fourth edition (published November 2009) contained corrections that had 
been identified since the 3rd edition was published in May of 2000. In addition, new 
material was added that was developed by the author in the 1990s and early part of the 
first decade of the 21st century. While some of this material was perhaps too detailed for 
an introduction, it was deemed of value and the author wanted to make it available to 
future JSC personnel in the interest of knowledge capture.  It was published as a JSC 
document to ensure preservation after the end of the Shuttle Program and availability to 
personnel across NASA.   
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Visiting Vehicles Rendezvous Training 
 
 Goodman, John L., Introduction to Relative Navigation Concepts for Visiting 
Vehicles Officers, First Edition, JSC-36583, Flight Dynamics Division, Mission 
Operations Directorate, NASA Johnson Space Center, September 2010.  182 
pages. 
 
 Goodman, John L. Introduction to Rendezvous Burn Targeting and Guidance 
Concepts for Visiting Vehicles Officers, First Edition, JSC-36584, Flight 
Dynamics Division, Mission Operations Directorate, NASA Johnson Space 
Center, September 2010.  242 pages. 
 
 
These books were based on the fourth edition of Introduction To Space Shuttle 
Rendezvous Guidance, Navigation, and Control, but with much new material and 
significant revision of material from the shuttle book.  The books were written for 
NASA/JSC Mission Operations personnel that were concerned with the rendezvous 
aspects of Visiting Vehicles (Soyuz, Progress, ATV, HTV, Dragon, Cygnus, etc.). 
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Introduction to Rendezvous Burn Targeting and Guidance Concepts for Visiting Vehicles 
Officers 
 
 Guidance, Navigation, and 
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Background on These Books 
 
In early 2010 the author was approached by MOD Flight Dynamics Division Visiting 
Vehicles Officers (VVO) about preparing a version of the shuttle rendezvous training 
document that was tailored to the needs and interests of the VVOs.  Work began on two 
volumes, Introduction to Relative Navigation Concepts for Visiting Vehicles Officers and 
Introduction to Rendezvous Burn Targeting and Guidance Concepts for Visiting Vehicles 
Officers in the spring of 2010.   
 
Since much technical information concerning Visiting Vehicles (Soyuz, Progress, 
Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV), H-II Transfer Vehicle (HTV), Dragon, Cygnus, etc.) 
was proprietary the author suggested that the new books discuss general concepts, as 
opposed to vehicle specific details.  This would ensure that the books could be made 
available to personnel working multiple NASA programs.  This approach was taken. 
 
Much material from the fourth edition of Introduction To Space Shuttle Rendezvous 
Guidance, Navigation, and Control was used, but most shuttle specific details were 
removed.  Most pages copied from the shuttle book were extensively re-written and 
additional research was performed.  Some Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, and Space Shuttle 
details were included to illustrate rendezvous and proximity operations concepts.   
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Compilation Volumes of Rendezvous and Proximity Operations Papers 
 
 Goodman, John L., (editor), Space Shuttle Rendezvous and Proximity Operations 
Overview and Experience Papers, Volume 1 of 2 (1970-1985), JSC-35050, Flight 
Dynamics Division, Mission Operations Directorate, NASA Johnson Space 
Center, July 2011.  633 pages. 
 
 Goodman, John L., (editor), Space Shuttle Rendezvous and Proximity Operations 
Overview and Experience Papers, Volume 2 of 2 (1986-2009), JSC-35050, Flight 
Dynamics Division, Mission Operations Directorate, NASA Johnson Space 
Center, July 2011.  969 pages. 
 
 Goodman, John L., (editor), Space Shuttle Rendezvous Profile Design Papers, 
Volume 1 of 2 (1969-1983), JSC-35051, Flight Dynamics Division, Mission 
Operations Directorate, NASA Johnson Space Center, July 2011.  744 pages. 
 
 Goodman, John L., (editor), Space Shuttle Rendezvous Profile Design Papers, 
Volume 2 of 2 (1984-2007), JSC-35051, Flight Dynamics Division, Mission 
Operations Directorate, NASA Johnson Space Center, July 2011.  756 pages. 
 
 Goodman, John L., (editor), Space Shuttle Proximity Operations Design Papers, 
Volume 1 of 2 (1970-1979), JSC-35052, Flight Dynamics Division, Mission 
Operations Directorate, NASA Johnson Space Center, July 2011.  1145 pages. 
 
 Goodman, John L., (editor), Space Shuttle Proximity Operations Design Papers, 
Volume 2 of 2 (1980-2009), JSC-35052, Flight Dynamics Division, Mission 
Operations Directorate, NASA Johnson Space Center, July 2011.  810 pages. 
 
 Goodman, John L., (editor), Space Shuttle Rendezvous Maneuver Targeting 
Papers, JSC-35053, Flight Dynamics Division, Mission Operations Directorate, 
NASA Johnson Space Center, July 2011.  1178 pages. 
 
 Goodman, John L., (editor), Space Shuttle Relative Navigation Papers, Volume 1 
of 2 (1969-1979), JSC-35054, Flight Dynamics Division, Mission Operations 
Directorate, NASA Johnson Space Center, July 2011.  1244 pages. 
 
 Goodman, John L., (editor), Space Shuttle Relative Navigation Papers, Volume 2 
of 2 (1980-2010), JSC-35054, Flight Dynamics Division, Mission Operations 
Directorate, NASA Johnson Space Center, July 2011.  1056 pages. 
 
 Goodman, John L., (editor), Gemini Rendezvous Papers, JSC-35055, Flight 
Dynamics Division, Mission Operations Directorate, NASA Johnson Space 
Center, July 2011.  1558 pages. 
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 Goodman, John L., (editor), Apollo Rendezvous Papers, Volume 1 – Lunar 
Missions, JSC-35056, Flight Dynamics Division, Mission Operations Directorate, 
NASA Johnson Space Center, July 2011.  1816 pages. 
 
 Goodman, John L., (editor), Apollo Rendezvous Papers, Volume 2 – Skylab and 
Apollo/Soyuz, JSC-35056, Flight Dynamics Division, Mission Operations 
Directorate, NASA Johnson Space Center, July 2011.  936 pages. 
 
Each compilation volume contains a chapter that provides an overview of the documents, 
memos, and presentations in the volume.  This is followed by chapters listing additional 
resources on rendezvous (JSC documents, NASA contractor reports, and open literature 
papers).   
 
Table of Contents for Each Volume 
 
 Series Preface 
 Introduction 
 Overview of Documents in This Volume 
 Sections with references for: 
o Rendezvous Training Documents, Crew Procedures, and Console Handbooks 
o Space Shuttle Flight Software Requirements 
o Additional Resources on Rendezvous 
 Documents by Year 
 
Background on the Compilations 
 
During the research and writing of the Space Shuttle Rendezvous and Proximity Operations 
Experience Report from June 2002 to March 2003 a significant amount of primary source 
material was collected and examined.
1
   This material, plus other rendezvous documentation 
collected by the editor over a period of 20 years, took up five filing cabinets and two bookshelves   
Included in this material were documents that provided insight into shuttle rendezvous and 
proximity operations profile evolution, navigation hardware development, burn targeting software 
architecture, technical challenges, flight experiences, and lessons learned.   
 
In June of 2008, with the end of the Space Shuttle Program approaching, the editor conceived the 
idea of preserving some of the more insightful documents in a manner that would make them 
easily available to future engineers and historians.  While some primary source material on 
NASA human flight rendezvous and proximity operations was preserved in existing collections 
that were easily accessible, many key documents collected by the editor were not.  The 
documentation was sorted and key memos and presentations were assembled into 12 rendezvous 
and proximity operations compilation volumes 
 
                                                 
1
 Goodman, John L., and Kelli S. Wiuff, Space Shuttle Rendezvous and Proximity Operations Experience 
Report, JSC-49626, Flight Design and Dynamics Division, Mission Operations Directorate, NASA Johnson 
Space Center, February 2003. 
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History of Space Shuttle Rendezvous 
 
 Goodman, John L., History of Space Shuttle Rendezvous, Revision 3, JSC-63400, 
Flight Dynamics Division, Mission Operations Directorate, NASA Johnson Space 
Center, October 2011.  316 pages 
 
This is a revised edition of the History of Space Shuttle Rendezvous, updated through the 
end of the Space Shuttle Program.  The original edition, published in October of 2006, 
was 87 pages long and grew out of a much shorter article that appeared in the AIAA 
Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets at the same time.
1
   
 
The book provides a high level overview of shuttle rendezvous missions, evolution of 
rendezvous and proximity operations profiles and development of relative navigation and 
burn targeting sub-systems.  The revised edition also includes updated and lengthened 
chapters covering rendezvous activities of the Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, and Apollo/Soyuz 
missions.  Three new special focus chapters were added to provide additional insight on 
shuttle rendezvous missions.   These chapters include the STS-39 deploy/retrieve 
mission, missions to the Hubble Space Telescope (HST), and the STS-130 mission to the 
International Space Station. 
 
A fourth chapter answers the question, “Why was shuttle rendezvous and docking not 
fully automated?”  The chapter covers the levels of automation versus manual control on 
the Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, and Space Shuttle vehicles.  Included is a discussion of 
why the final approach and landing of the Space Shuttle was manually flown.  
Appendices list NASA and contractor Mission Control rendezvous team members that 
supported missions from June 1983 through the end of the Shuttle Program in July of 
2011. 
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1
 Goodman, John L., “History of Space Shuttle Rendezvous and Proximity Operations,” AIAA Journal of 
Spacecraft and Rockets, Vol. 43, No. 5, Sept.-Oct. 2006, pp. 944-959. 
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 Shuttle Design Reference Missions  
 Plume Impingement  
 On-Board Systems  
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 Coelliptic versus Stable Orbit Rendezvous  
 First Proximity Operations and Rendezvous Flights  
 Challenges of Subsequent Rendezvous and Proximity Operations Flights  
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 Deployment and Retrieval of Scientific Payloads   
 Retrieval and Return to Earth of a Satellite   
 Mir and the International Space Station  
 The STORRM DTO 
 STS-39, the Most Complex Deploy/Retrieve Mission   
 A Closer Look at the Hubble Servicing Missions  
 STS-130 Mission to the ISS 
 Why Was Shuttle Rendezvous And Docking Not Fully Automated? 
 Appendices listing Mission Control rendezvous team members.  
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Guidance and Targeting Reports 
 
Four of the five reports in this chapter concern the algorithms use to target and guide 
rendezvous burns while the Space Shuttle was acquiring and processing relative 
navigation measurements during rendezvous (range to the target spacecraft typically less 
than 40 nautical miles).  The fifth report (two volumes) concerns the powered flight 
guidance algorithm used for ascent, orbit insertion, and deorbit.  Four of the reports are 
compilation volumes that preserve primary source documents in a manner to make them 
understandable to future generations of engineers. 
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Lambert Targeting Compilation 
 
 Goodman, John L., (editor), Space Shuttle Lambert Targeting, JSC-49708, Flight 
Design and Dynamics Division, NASA JSC, May 2003.  336 pages. 
 
This is a compilation of reports and presentations on the theory behind the rendezvous 
burn Lambert targeting algorithm used in the shuttle flight software.  Some of the 
material was collected and used during investigation of the STS-49 (May 1992) Lambert 
targeting anomaly.
1
 
 
Lambert Cyclic Guidance Compilation 
 
 Goodman, John L., (editor), Space Shuttle Lambert Cyclic Guidance, JSC-49709, 
Flight Design and Dynamics Division, NASA JSC, May 2003.  556 pages. 
 
This report is a collection of documents concerning closed loop Lambert cyclic guidance, 
used by the Space Shuttle for rendezvous burns targeted with the on-board Lambert 
targeting algorithm.  The algorithm was a form of correlated velocity guidance.  It used a 
burn position biasing equation developed by Tim Brand of Draper Laboratory and 
discussed by Dr. Richard Battin at the end of the introduction to An Introduction to the 
Mathematics and Methods of Astrodynamics.
2
  The report contains memos detailing the 
STS-69 Lambert cyclic guidance performance investigation.
1
 
 
STS-49 Lambert Targeting Compilation 
 
 Goodman, John L., (editor), STS-49 Lambert Targeting Anomaly and Aftermath, 
JSC-49710, Flight Design and Dynamics Division, NASA JSC, May 2003.  640 
pages. 
 
This report contains extensive documentation of the STS-49 (May 1992) Lambert 
targeting anomaly and analysis conducted in support of the investigation.
1
  Also included 
are memos and presentations concerning a Lambert targeting software problem 
discovered five days before the flight of STS-51 in September of 1993.
1
   
 
                                                 
1
 Goodman, John L., Lessons Learned From Seven Space Shuttle Missions, NASA Contractor Report 
NASA/CR-2007-213697, NASA Johnson Space Center, January 2007.   
2
 Battin, Richard H., An Introduction to the Mathematics and Methods of Astrodynamics, Revised Edition, 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Reston, VA, 1999. 
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Lambert Cyclic Guidance Upgrade 
 
 Meissen, Thomas J., Space Shuttle Lambert Guidance Improvement, SCR 
92843/93009 OI-32, JSC-49830, NASA/JSC Flight Design and Dynamics 
Division, October 28, 2006.  84 pages.      
 
In the aftermath of the STS-69 Lambert cyclic guidance performance anomaly on STS-69 
(September 1995) John Goodman developed and tested an upgraded version of Lambert 
guidance.
1, 2
  This upgrade was later approved for incorporation into the flight software.  
The report by Thomas Meissen details the engineering work performed to transform the 
upgrade into a shuttle flight software change.
3
  The first flight of the upgraded Lambert 
guidance algorithm (flight software version OI-32) was the STS-120 (October-November 
2007) mission of Discovery to the International Space Station. 
 
                                                 
1
 Goodman, John L., Lessons Learned From Seven Space Shuttle Missions, NASA Contractor Report 
NASA/CR-2007-213697, NASA Johnson Space Center, January 2007.   
2
 Goodman, John L., (editor), Space Shuttle Lambert Cyclic Guidance, JSC-49709, Flight Design and 
Dynamics Division, NASA JSC, May 2003.   
3
 On September 13, 2005 the report was provided to a Boeing engineer who was responsible for testing the 
guidance upgrade in the Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory (SAIL) in JSC/Building 16.  The engineer 
had no previous experience with Lambert guidance.  The response upon examining the report was, “Oh, 
boy, I think I hit the mother lode!!  I need to buy a lottery ticket today.” 
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Compilation of Powered Explicit Guidance Papers 
 
 Goodman, John L., (editor), Compilation of Powered Explicit Guidance Papers 
(1971-1980), Volume I, JSC-64694, NASA JSC Flight Dynamics Division, 
February 2010.  1032 pages. 
 
 Goodman, John L., (editor), Compilation of Powered Explicit Guidance Papers 
(1981-2010), Volume II, JSC-64694, NASA JSC Flight Dynamics Division, 
February 2010.  992 pages. 
 
These volumes preserve for future generations of engineers 91 documents created over a 
period of 40 years concerning Space Shuttle Powered Explicit Guidance (PEG).  
Although the initial theoretical development of the vector Linear Tangent Guidance 
(LTG) predictor corrector algorithm that forms the basis of PEG occurred in about 1970, 
PEG is still a state-of-the-art guidance algorithm.
1
  PEG performed flawlessly over the 
life of the Shuttle Program for nominal ascent, orbit insertion, deorbit, and aborts.  PEG 
was also selected for orbit insertion and deorbit guidance of the Orion vehicle, and was 
chosen by the Marshall Space Flight Center for Ares I guidance.  PEG was used for lunar 
landing and ascent guidance in the NASA Autonomous Landing and Hazard Avoidance 
Technology (ALHAT) project in the Constellation Program and other lunar landing 
studies. 
 
These volumes cover three phases of shuttle guidance history.  The first is 1971 and 1972 
(Volume I), when studies were performed on potential shuttle guidance algorithms.  The 
second phase (Volume I) covers 1973 through 1980 when the basic PEG theory was 
further developed and adapted into a workable Shuttle guidance algorithm covering 
powered ascent, aborts, orbit insertion, and deorbit.  The third phase (Volume II) covers 
1981 through 2010 and consists mostly of educational memos and presentations on PEG 
along with some material on PEG performance improvements. 
 
Both volumes include the memories and commentary of three engineers who participated 
in PEG development and improvement in the 1970s and 1980s.  Footnotes were included 
by the editor to provide additional background information.  Additional sections list other 
resources for shuttle powered flight guidance, such as training manuals, software 
requirements, and other JSC documents. 
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1
 Jaggers, Roland F., “An Explicit Solution to the Exoatmospheric Powered Flight Guidance and Trajectory 
Optimization Problem for Rocket Propelled Vehicles,” AIAA Guidance and Control Conference, 
Hollywood, FL, August 8-10, 1977. 
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 Comments by PEG Development Veterans  
 Shuttle Ascent Training Documents 
 First Stage Ascent Guidance 
 Flight Software Requirements 
 Other Relevant JSC Documents 
 91 PEG documents in chronological order 
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Apollo and Orion Reports 
 
The three conference papers in this chapter were written in support of the Orion Program.  
Two are specifically about Orion, while the Apollo 13 paper was written to provide Orion 
engineers with lessons learned from that mission.  An overview of Apollo entry guidance 
was written by an Apollo veteran for Orion personnel. 
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Apollo 13 Guidance, Navigation, and Control Challenges 
 
 Goodman, John L., “Apollo 13 Guidance, Navigation, and Control Challenges,” 
AIAA Space 2009 Conference & Exposition, September 14-17, 2009, Pasadena, 
CA.  42 pages. 
 
This paper was written to specifically address guidance, navigation, and control (GNC) 
aspects of the Apollo 13 mission for personnel working on Orion contingency return to 
Earth techniques and GNC design. Books written for the general public and NASA 
reports on the mission focus on the life support, power, thermal control, and human 
interest aspects of Apollo 13.  The paper was written based on research using the crew 
debrief transcript, the air-to-ground communications transcript, and post flight reports 
written by Mission Control and Mission Planning and Analysis Division (MPAD) 
personnel immediately after the flight. 
 
Topics include the nominal mission and lunar trajectory plan, nominal crew activities, 
GNC performance before the oxygen tank incident, flight control challenges immediately 
after the incident until Lunar Module (LM) activation, LM Inertial Measurement Unit 
(IMU) alignments using the Sun instead of stars, re-establishing the return to Earth 
trajectory, trajectory correction burns, use of the Earth as a pointing cue to achieve burn 
attitudes, ground based orbit determination challenges, maneuvers to burn attitudes, LM 
and Service Module separation from the Command Module, separation trajectories, re-
entry, and landing.  Lessons learned from Apollo 13 as related to GNC and ground 
support personnel are detailed. The GNC architectures and hardware components of the 
Lunar and Command/Service Modules are discussed in an appendix. 
 
 
 
Apollo and Orion Reports 
Approved for public release via STI DAA 24818. See statement on title page. 
80 
Introduction to Apollo Entry Guidance and Flight Performance 
 
Burton, John K., Introduction to Apollo Entry Guidance and Flight Performance, JSC-
35020, NASA JSC Flight Design and Dynamics Division, July 2009.  62 pages. 
 
This document was written by Apollo and Space Shuttle entry guidance veteran John 
Burton (formerly of United Space Alliance) to introduce Constellation personnel to 
Apollo entry guidance.  It includes discussion of theoretical entry guidance developments 
before Apollo, Primary Guidance, Navigation, and Control System (PGNCS) entry 
guidance, the backup Entry Monitoring System (EMS), and the entry guidance 
performance footprint.  Excerpts from Apollo mission reports concerning re-entry 
performance are also included. 
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Challenges of Orion Rendezvous Development 
 
 Goodman, John L., J. P. Brazzel, and D. A. Chart, Ph.D., “Challenges of Orion 
Rendezvous Development,” AIAA Guidance, Navigation, and Control 
Conference, AIAA, Reston, VA, 2007.  30 pages. 
 
The paper “Challenges of Orion Rendezvous Development” details differences between 
Orion and previous NASA human spacecraft (Gemini, Apollo, and the Space Shuttle) in 
the areas of rendezvous, proximity operations, and docking.  Differences discussed 
include mission requirements and Orion sub-systems.  Orion had requirements for a 
higher level of automation and autonomy during rendezvous and docking than previous 
NASA human spacecraft.  Automation and autonomy are discussed in detail, as well as 
the importance of balancing levels of authority (crew and ground), automation, and 
autonomy so that mission success and crew safety is ensured. 
 
Topics Covered 
 
 Introduction 
 Programmatic Challenges 
 Rendezvous from Gemini to Orion 
 Orion Rendezvous 
 Automation and Autonomy for Orion 
 Conclusion 
 Appendix – Historical Summary of Automation in NASA Human Flight 
Programs 
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Orion On-Board Navigation Architecture and Operations Concepts 
 
 Goodman, John L., H. R. Mamich, and D. W. Saley, “Orion On-Board Navigation 
Architecture and Operations Concepts,” Guidance and Control 2008, Advances in 
the Astronautical Sciences, Volume 131, Univelt, San Diego, CA, 2008, pp. 425-
444.  20 pages. 
 
This paper describes the Orion navigation architecture, sensors, and operations concepts 
as of February of 2008.  The Orion navigation team was tasked to design a navigation 
architecture incorporating advanced technology and new operations concepts, while 
facing challenges of low technological readiness levels, crew safety, and limitations in 
vehicle weight, available power, budget, and schedule. While Orion was to fly the same 
flight phases as Apollo, there were important navigation differences between the 
spacecraft.  Optical tracking of lunar landmarks and stars was to be performed 
automatically, rather than using Apollo era human-in-the-loop sextant tracking.  On-
board GPS orbit determination could be used in low Earth orbit to supplement ground 
radar tracking. GPS technology would be used to fly long-range lunar return skip entry 
trajectories that were not flown during crewed Apollo missions. Orion navigation was 
more automated than navigation systems on previous NASA human flight vehicles and 
would require less crew interaction. 
 
The paper discusses the evolution of the Orion navigation system design and changes that 
occurred during the design phase.  Changes to the navigation system stemming from the 
2007 vehicle weight reduction exercise are detailed.  Back-up and emergency navigation 
capabilities are discussed, along with fault detection, isolation, and recovery.  The 
navigation operations concepts during the pre-launch, nominal ascent, ascent abort, Earth 
orbit, low Earth orbit rendezvous, transit to and from the Moon, low lunar orbit, lunar 
orbit rendezvous, nominal atmospheric entry, and entry following an ascent abort are 
detailed. 
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Compilations of Draper Laboratory Papers 
 
 Goodman, John L. (editor), Charles Stark Draper Laboratory Apollo Papers, JSC 
-35085, Flight Dynamics Division, Mission Operations Directorate, NASA 
Johnson Space Center, June 2011.  1712 pages. 
 
 Goodman, John L. (editor), Charles Stark Draper Laboratory Space Shuttle 
Papers, JSC-35083, Flight Dynamics Division, Mission Operations Directorate, 
NASA Johnson Space Center, June 2011.  1739 pages. 
 
These volumes contain memos, formal reports, conference papers, and presentations 
covering the years 1959-2010 by personnel from the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory 
(before 1970 called the MIT Instrumentation Laboratory).  The first document covers the 
Apollo and Skylab Programs, while the second covers the Space Shuttle Program.  
Draper Lab made significant guidance, navigation, and control contributions to both 
programs.  The reports preserved in these volumes are an important source of information 
on guidance, navigation, and control algorithms and techniques.  
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Summary 
 
The motivation to write the reports and the knowledge capture approach used was based 
on experiences with Shuttle Program corporate knowledge loss and difficulties 
encountered during the Orion Program with technical history research into Apollo and the 
Space Shuttle.  Some of the reports were written for internal knowledge capture and 
training, other were written to transmit lessons learned and experiences to external 
audiences, and other reports and document compilations were created during the 
knowledge capture efforts near the end of the Space Shuttle Program.  Subject matter 
experts with proficiency for research and written communication were used as report 
authors to ensure that quality reports were created in a timely and low cost manner.  
Complete paragraphs and sentences rather than bullet points and spreadsheets were used 
to ensure effective knowledge transfer to current and future engineers.  Effective 
knowledge capture to prevent corporate knowledge loss and educate future engineers is 
necessary to reduce technical, cost, schedule, mission success, and flight safety risk 
during both vehicle development and mission execution. 
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